Wage and Hour Law Update : Wage & Hour Lawyer & Attorney : Jackson Lewis Law Firm : Minimum Wage, Overtime & Service Contracts

As every California employer knows, wage and hour class actions in California are never-ending.  One basis for many of these class actions has been employers' alleged non-compliance with California meal and rest period requirements.  As to meal periods, the two overriding issues have been whether an employer is required to ensure non-exempt employees take their meal period or just offer such an opportunity and whether such meal period must be taken prior to completion of 5 hours of work.   This issue has significant financial ramifications to California employers as California law imposes a penalty of 1 hour of wages for each day an employee misses a meal period and for each day an employee misses a rest period.  The California Supreme Court is currently reviewing these issues in two consolidated cases and is expected to schedule oral argument in the coming months.  Once oral argument before the court occurs and the court hands down its decision within 90 days thereafter as required by California law, we hope there will be some clarity on these issues.

Robert Pattison, Managing Partner of Jackson Lewis' San Francisco office, has prepared a white paper discussing these issues in detail.  This white paper, which includes a statutory analysis and a discussion of the shifting positions of the State Labor Commissioner, can be accessed at this link. Most importantly, Jackson Lewis suggests that to ensure compliance pending this decision, California employers continue to ensure that no non-exempt employees works more than 5 hours without taking a meal period.

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While the FLSA undeniably provides a plaintiff with the right to assert a statutory claim for unpaid overtime and receive all statutory damages, whether, and under what circumstances, such a claim can be asserted under a state wage and hour law is not always so clear.  In fact, in Maryland, courts had reached conflicting conclusions as to whether such a statutory claim could be asserted in a misclassification or similar case where the claim was not based on an employer's failure to pay promised overtime (i.e., unpaid recorded overtime by a non-exempt employee).  Effective October 1, 2010, this issue is no longer in dispute in Maryland as the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law has been amended to include "overtime wages" within the definition of wages. 2010 Md. ALS 99.  Maryland employers must now recognize that they are potentially subject to both federal and state liability for unpaid overtime.

This enactment highlights the need to analyze all potential wage and hour strategies and liabilities under both federal and state law.

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On April 22, 2010, a revised version of the Employee Misclassification Prevention Act (“Act”) was introduced. If enacted, the Act, would amend the FLSA and provide a host of new enforcement mechanisms and penalties to combat employer use of the “independent contractor” classification to avoid minimum wage and overtime payment obligations.

If passed the Act would (among other provisions):

• require employers to keep records reflecting the correct status of each worker as an employee or nonemployee (which the FLSA currently does not require);

• require employers to notify workers in writing of their classification as an employee or nonemployee (not required); and

• make it unlawful to retaliate against non-employee workers who advocate for their rights under the Act (as discussed here, the FLSA does not typically protect non-employees from retaliation for seeking alleged unpaid monies).

Due to the federal and state focus on misclassification, all employers should closely review whether contractors are “economically dependent” on the business as well as (1) the degree of control exercised by the employer over the workers; (2) the workers' opportunity for profit or loss and their investment in the business; (3) the degree of skill and independent initiative required to perform the work; (4) the permanence or duration of the working relationship; and (5) the extent to which the work is an integral part of the employer's business.” See, e.g. Velu v. Velocity Express, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 2d 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 

A more detailed Jackson Lewis analysis of the proposed legislation is available here.

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Under the FLSA (and most state laws), the fluctuating workweek method (FWW) of overtime payment allows employers to reduce overtime expense by paying “half time” for all overtime hours if the following four factors are satisfied: 1) employees’ hours fluctuate from week; (2) employees receive a fixed salary each week that does not vary with the number of non-overtime hours worked during each workweek; 3) the fixed salary provides compensation every week at a regular rate that is at least equal to the minimum wage, and 4) the employer and employees’ share a “clear mutual understanding” that Defendants will pay that fixed salary regardless of the number of hours worked.

However, as demonstrated by last week’s decision by United States District Court Judge Jose L. Linares of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, an employer who sets out to utilize the FWW approach pays a strict penalty for non-compliance. See Brumley v. Camin Cargo Control, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126785 (D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2009). 

In his decision, Judge Linares denied summary judgment to defendants in this collective action based on the employer having made one impermissible deduction to one employee.   The Court rejected the employer’s argument that an isolated event of this type was statistically insignificant, stating that such an assertion goes to “weight.” More importantly, the Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs based on the employer making additional payments to employees, such as offshore pay, holiday pay and day-off pay, finding that due to such payments, the employer did not pay the fixed salary required to utilize the FWW overtime calculation method.

The negative implications of this decision did not end here.   In evaluating potential damages, the Court rejected the employer’s argument that damages should be calculated based on the half-time method that is part and parcel of the FWW calculation of overtime and held that “the default FLSA damage calculation, ‘time-and-a-half for all hours over 40,’” should apply to Plaintiffs who were not paid properly. The Court also denied summary judgment to both parties as to whether FLSA liquidated damages and a 3-year statute of limitations should be imposed, finding that trial testimony is necessary to determine whether the employer acted in good faith and took reasonable steps to comply with the FWW calculation methodology. Finally, citing to the FLSA regulations and precedent within the Third Circuit, the Court rejected the employer’s argument that overpayments from different pay periods be applied to offset liability.

Employees who avail themselves of the fluctuating workweek method of overtime should ensure they are properly implementing its requirements.

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On the heels of its ruling in Shady Grove regarding the inapplicability of state procedural rules in federal court (discussed here), on April 19, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision reviving another dismissed class action.  In Holster v. Gatco Inc., Case Number 08-1307, the Court granted the appeal petition of an individual seeking to bring a class action in New York federal court under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (a different law than the one at issue in Shady Grove), and sent the case immediately back to the Second Circuit to consider whether the plaintiff could proceed with a Rule 23 class action in light of Shady Grove. Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3118 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2010).  This second ruling reinforces the initial interpretation of Shady Grove: namely, that class actions brought in federal court (including those alleging state law claims under statutes such as the New York Labor Law) are governed by Rule 23, and procedural limitations on those class actions contained in the state’s procedural rules may not apply. 

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Employers must not only ensure compliance with the federal minimum wage but also any applicable state minimum wage.  Nevada’s minimum wage is dependent on whether an employer offers qualified health insurance benefits.  Effective July 1, 2010, the Nevada minimum wage increases to $8.25 per hour for employers that do not offer qualified health insurance benefits, and to $7.25 per hour for employees that do offer such benefits.   While the $7.25 rate comports with the FLSA, it is still relevant to Nevada employers as Nevada requires payment of daily overtime if an employee works more than 8 hours in a day and has a regular rate of pay of less than 1½ times the state minimum wage. 

For further information, see Nevada Minimum Wage, Daily Overtime to Increase on July 1 at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/article.cfm?aid=2037. 

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On March 31, Magistrate Judge John Tunheim of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota issued a lengthy opinion in several consolidated FLSA actions brought by a group of securities brokers who alleged they were misclassified as exempt under the FLSA.  In re Rbc Dain Rauscher Overtime Litig., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32413 (D. Minn. March 31, 2010).  The opinion addresses several issues relevant to financial services industry employers including:

• The applicability of the “learned professional exemption – the Court denied summary judgment to the Defendant on this issue as to one broker because based on the record the Court could not determine that the knowledge utilized by the broker (who possessed a Series 7 license and an MBA) to perform his job was customarily acquired via academic instruction.  Id. at * 30-36;

• Whether a “non-forgivable” but recoverable draw satisfies the salary basis payment requirement - the Court held that a non-forgivable but recoverable draw that never fell below the minimum salary required for exemption ($455 per week under federal law) satisfied the salary basis, even though the draw was reconciled in calculating commissions.  Id. at * 37-43.  In reaching this finding the Court cited a United States Department of Labor opinion letter issued by then-Wage and Hour Administrator and current Jackson Lewis partner and head of the Jackson Lewis Wage and Hour Practice Group, Paul DeCamp; and

• Impact of the “Highly Compensated” exemption test – the Court held that brokers who met the “highly compensated” threshold set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 541.601 (i.e., payment of the salary basis minimum and total compensation of at least $100,000/year) were exempt, as they customarily and regularly performed exempt administrative duties by providing financial advice and analysis.  Id. at * 86-105.

In re RBC serves as a valuable primer for financial services firms seeking to identify and review the exemption issues that often arise in the financial services industry.  Unfortunately, the industry is under attack despite the high levels of compensation received by many industry employees. 

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Jackson Lewis previously advised clients and friends of the Health Care Reform Act’s provision requiring employers to provide employees breaks for breastfeeding: http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/article.cfm?aid=2016. (Regulations interpreting such requirements are expected to be issued within the next 6 months.)  Also contained in the over two thousand-page enactment is Section 1558, which adds a new Section 18C to the FLSA.  This new FLSA provision prohibits employers from discriminating or retaliating against any employee who has:

(1) received a credit under section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or a subsidy under section 1402 of this Act; (2) provided, caused to be provided, or is about to provide or cause to be provided to the employer, the Federal Government, or the attorney general of a State information relating to any violation of, or any act or omission the employee reasonably believes to be a violation of, any provision of this title (or an amendment made by this title); (3) testified or is about to testify in a proceeding concerning such violation; (4) assisted or participated, or is about to assist or participate, in such a proceeding; or (5) objected to, or refused to participate in, any activity, policy, practice, or assigned task that the employee (or other such person) reasonably believed to be in violation of any provision of this title (or amendment), or any order, rule, regulation, standard, or ban under this title (or amendment).

Aggrieved current or former employees who assert claims under this provision are entitled to a jury trial.

Employers can expect this cause of action for retaliation to be another tool in the arsenal of Plaintiffs’ lawyers.

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In yet another wage-and-hour decision with the potential to disrupt longstanding practices within an industry, a federal court in Florida has ruled that the FLSA’s “learned professional” exemption does not apply to a group of caseworkers providing child protection services for an state-authorized agency. Talbott, et al v. Lakeview Center, 06-cv-378 (N.D. Fla. February 2, 2010). The learned professional exemption requires that:

• An employee’s primary duty must be the performance of work requiring advanced knowledge, defined as work which is predominantly intellectual in character and which includes work requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment;

• The advanced knowledge must be in a field of science or learning; and

• The advanced knowledge must be customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction.

In Talbott, Plaintiffs were caseworkers in two different job titles who provided counseling services to families under the supervision of their “casework counselor supervisor.” The Plaintiffs alleged that while many of them held a degree related to social work, their actual job did not require them to use that degree or exercise any discretion or judgment. Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that Defendant’s “six- to eight-week . . . training course provided them with the knowledge necessary to perform their jobs” and accordingly the job requirements were “insufficient to meet the learned professional exemption’s requirement of advanced knowledge.” The Court agreed. It observed that while the Defendant had put forth evidence that it required a combination of education and experience to obtain the job, it was clear to the Court that “[t]he type of knowledge necessary to perform the duties . . . is gained by the employee in Lakeview’s training course.” The Court even found the violation to be willful and based on such finding extended the liability period to 3 years and awarded 100% liquidated damages.

Further (and economically devastating to the Defendant), the court concluded based on evidence in the record (including listing fixed hours in the job posting for the position and invoking an informal “flex time” concept with the employees to address circumstances where their hours would exceed 40) that the “contract” of employment with the Plaintiffs had been for 40 hours of work per week, and therefore Plaintiffs were entitled to overtime based on time and half their regular rate of pay based on a 40 hour workweek (i.e, 1.5 times (their weekly salary divided 40) times hours worked in excess of 40 in the week). The Court specifically rejected any overtime calculation based on dividing the weekly salary by total hours worked and paying ½ time for overtime hours. 

What are the lessons? First, all employers must ensure that individuals classified as exempt learned professionals have at the least Bachelors Degree in a specific discipline and that the educational coursework to achieve the degree is essential to the performance of job duties. Second, employers should be very wary of advising any employee classified as exempt that their salary covers a set number of hours per week. Rather, employers should advise employees that the salary covers all hours worked.

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Subsequent to our post of April 6, the California DLSE issued a lengthy new opinion letter regarding trainees, available here. In it, the Division upholds the uncompensated “intern” status of participants in the Year Up program, a program in which a not-for-profit places 18-24 year olds in underserved communities to develop marketable skills in the information technology arena for 6 month assignments. The Division applied the six factor conjunctive test utilized under federal law in reaching its conclusion:

1)  The training, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the employer, is similar to that which would be given in a vocational school;

2)  The training is for the benefit of the trainee

3)  The trainees do not displace regular employees, but work under close observation

4)  The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the trainees and on occasion his operations may actually be impeded

5)  The trainees are not necessarily entitled to a job at the completion of the training period

6)  The employer and the trainees understand that the trainees are not entitled to wages for the time spent in training.

See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993).

The opinion letter departs from the DLSE’s more expansive eleven-factor test, which included the additional factors below, observing that they “do not appear to be based upon any source statute or regulation from which they derive nor are the additional factors identified with specific case law.”

7)       Any clinical training is part of an educational curriculum;

8)       the trainees or students do not receive employee benefits;

9)       the training is general, so as to qualify the trainees or students for work in any similar business, rather than designed specifically for a job with the employer offering the program, i.e. upon completion of the program, the trainees or students must not be fully trained to work specifically for only the employer offering the program;

10)   the screening process for the program is not the same as for employment, and does not appear to be for that purpose, but involves only criteria relevant for admission to an independent educational program, and

11)   advertisements for the program are couched clearly in terms of education or training, rather than employment, although the employer may indicate that qualified graduates will be considered for employment.

While the DLSE’s willingness to abandon these supplemental factors is an encouraging sign, the difficulty of satisfying the original six-factor test remains. Few internship programs, whether offered through the not-for-profit sector or otherwise, are as fully compliant with the prevailing federal test as that offered by Year Up.

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Often when analyzing whether a position is exempt, we only focus on whether the job duties are sufficient for exempt status. However, in most instances, there is a second requirement: compliance with the salary basis test.   A recent decision issued by Judge Larimer of the Western District of New York is a reminder to not overlook salary basis test compliance. Simply put, deductions from the salary of an exempt employee must be carefully monitored to ensure that they comply with the FLSA regulations and do not destroy the exemption. 

At issue in Scholtisek v. Eldre Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26664 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2010) was evidence presented at the summary judgment stage that the employer “both engaged in an actual practice of making unlawful deductions, and maintained a policy that created a significant likelihood of such deductions [from the salary of exempt employees]”, and that such a practice and policy destroyed the plaintiffs’ exempt status, entitling them to overtime under the FLSA. The Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, based on documentary evidence and admissions from the HR professionals responsible for the company’s payroll which together demonstrated that there had been a policy of making partial day deductions from the salaries of exempt employees for missed work time, in contravention of 29 CFR § 541.602. Defendant was not entitled to the “window of correction” to remedy the error, because the window is available to correct payroll mistakes, not unlawful policies.

The Court did not rule as to the appropriate remedy for this violation, observing that “[o]n the record before me, however, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law during what periods those improper deductions did occur, the extent to which they occurred, exactly which employees or job classifications were affected by this practice, or the number of hours for which plaintiffs are entitled to overtime pay. The amount of damages therefore remains to be decided.” The Court will ultimately need to rule as to whether the exemption loss was limited to only those who were subject to an actual deduction and/or whether for the period of time for which the exemption was lost is limited only to those individual workweeks in which the deduction was taken.

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In today’s world, it is not overly difficult for a prospective employer to learn that an applicant has sued a prior employer under the FLSA. Can the prospective employer decide not to hire based on this information? 

In Dellinger v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32861 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2010), Judge Cacheris of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, held that an employer could do so, finding that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision only protects employees, and not applicants. In reaching its decision, the court relied on two district court cases from other jurisdictions with similar holdings – Harper v. San Luis Valley Regional Medical Center, 848 F.Supp. 911 (D. Colo. 1994) and Glover v. City of North Charleston, 942 F. Supp. 243 (D.S.C. 1996). Judge Cacheris continually referred to the express language of the FLSA and declined to expand the definition of “employee” (meaning one who is “suffered or permitted” to work) to include applicants, observing that the plaintiff had never performed any work for the defendant. 

While no appellate court has ruled on this particular issue, Dellinger supports an employer’s right to disqualify applicants based on previous filings of FLSA suits. 

Of course while such information regarding prospective employees can be easily acquired in the era of the online social network, with extensive information about almost any subject only a click or two away through so-called “open source” searches, there are numerous potential pitfalls including potential FCRA violations and violations of “lawful activities” statutes (such as N.Y. Labor Law § 201-d) in gathering such information.

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In the Second Circuit, employees generally can waive their right to bring a class or collective action as long as the cost of arbitrating the case on an individual basis is not cost-prohibitive  and does not “remov[e] the plaintiff’s only reasonably feasible means of recovery.”  See In Re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009).   In late March, Judge Gleeson of the Eastern District of New York analyzed the viability of such a collective/class action waiver in the wage and hour context.  The court upheld the waiver finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that individual litigation would be “cost-prohibitive.”  Judge Gleeson rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that incurring arbitration costs of up to $1,500 to process the arbitration rendered the agreement substantively unconscionable.” See Reid, et al. v. Supershuttle International, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26831 (E.D.N.Y. March 22, 2010).

This decision parallels the Southern District of New York’s recent decision in Arrigo v. Blue Fish Commodities Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9547 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2010), in which the court also  dismissed an employee’s Fair Labor Standards Act collective action and required him to arbitrate his claim on an individual basis pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.  See “Federal Courts in New York Continue to Enforce Arbitration Agreements” http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/article.cfm?aid=1989 for a further discussion of this decision and other recent New York federal court decisions addressing mandatory arbitration.

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For years, students and recent graduates have accepted internships with employers to gain work and practical experience.   Many, if not most, employers have treated and continue to treat these internships as “unpaid.” What’s more, in many industries (including film and advertising) this practice is an institutional rite of passage – part of “dues paying”.  Recent actions and pronouncements by representatives of the federal and various state departments of labor require employers to review their practices to ensure that good intentions (or professional rites of passage) are not leading to wage and hour liability. 

Technically, under the FLSA, there is no such thing as an “intern.”  In general, in order for an employer to avoid any minimum wage obligations an individual must be a “volunteer” or a “trainee”.  Since volunteers generally are not recognized in the for-profit sector, the utility of that classification is limited.   Thus interns, if they are to be unpaid, most likely must be “trainees” for FLSA purposes. In order to determine if an individual is a “trainee” exempt from minimum wage, the following six factors generally must be satisfied. 

1.      The training, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the employer, is similar to what would be given in a vocational school or academic educational instruction;

2.      The training is for the benefit of the trainees;

3.      The trainees do not displace regular employees, but work under their close observation;

4.      The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the trainees, and on occasion the employer’s operations may actually be impeded;

5.      The trainees are not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the training period; and

6.      The employer and the trainees understand that the trainees are not entitled to wages for the time spent in training.

The rub is that in many instances the intern is performing productive work that would normally be performed by a paid employee. In such a situation, even if the intern is receiving school credit, minimum wage is due under the FLSA.  In fact, per Nancy J. Leppink, the acting director of the USDOL’s Wage and Hour Division: ““If you’re a for-profit employer or you want to pursue an internship with a for-profit employer, there aren’t going to be many circumstances where you can have an internship and not be paid and still be in compliance with the law.”   It is also vital for those with internship programs to note that M. Patricia Smith, the Solicitor of Labor responsible for coordinating the Wage and Hour Division, initiated investigations against several businesses for their use of interns during her tenure as New York Commissioner of Labor.

As always, state law also must be considered.  While many states track the FLSA standard, there are various differentiations particularly relevant to multi-state employers.   For example, in New York, if an individual is receiving school credit, the individual generally is exempt from minimum wage payment obligations under state law.

What is the takeaway?  Businesses need to analyze exactly what the intern will do during the internship.  If the intern’s time will be spent primarily on productive work that would normally be performed by another employee, the business should consider paying the intern minimum wage to avoid any trailing legal issues.

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The Supreme Court dealt a blow to New York wage-and-hour defendants sued in federal court last week, overruling established precedent requiring plaintiffs bringing New York Labor Law (“Labor Law”) class actions in federal court to waive the 25% liquidated damages “penalty” in order to proceed on a class basis.  In Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. LEXIS 2929 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2010), the Supreme Court applied the age-old test from Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and held that the state law rule requiring such a waiver is “procedural” as opposed to “substantive”, and has no application in federal court, where opt-out class actions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 

Class action Labor Law plaintiffs in federal court now may seek a 25% penalty in behalf of all class members, increasing the potential class-wide damages.  It remains a divided question, unanswered by the higher courts, as to whether any wage-and-hour plaintiff may recover the 25% penalty and the 100% liquidated damages under the FLSA for the same time period.  Compare Yu G. Ke v. Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 240, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) with Jin v. Pac. Buffet House, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74901 at * 24 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009).

Other states containing class action limitations in their state procedural codes, whose federal courts previously had deferred to the state rule, may now also be subject to class actions in federal court seeking relief under the state’s wage-and-hour laws.   However, the Court did not conclusively state that all such provisions were unenforceable but rather focused its analysis on the intent of the New York provision requiring waiver of penalties.

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There are many reasons an employer may decide to reclassify an employee from exempt to non-exempt: changes in the law; modified court or DOL interpretations of existing law; as a result of an internal audit; or, simply based on changes in the business needs of the company. Does that decision to reclassify create evidence that the employee was “misclassified” as exempt, and that the misclassification was willful? No, said the court in Clarke v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08-CV-2400 (S.D.N.Y., March 26, 2010), holding that reclassification does not establish that the employee was misclassified, or that any violation was willful.

In Clarke, the employer decided to reclassify various technical computer workers based on the increasing number of FLSA suits. Because one of the plaintiffs who had been reclassified waited over two years after the reclassification to file suit, the FLSA claim was time barred unless he could establish the employer “willfully” violated the law, extending the FLSA statute of limitations to three years.

In support of his claim that he was misclassified and that the misclassification was willful (thus saving the claim), plaintiff argued the decision to reclassify itself demonstrated knowledge that the prior classification was wrong. The court rejected this, and held the decision to reclassify did not establish a willful violation, but just the opposite: a good faith effort by the Company to ensure that the company’s classification complied with the FLSA. The reclassification was likely a conservative measure adopted at a time when FLSA collective action overtime lawsuits were becoming more and more common, the court held.  Indeed, the court held “if the mere fact of a reclassification were enough to trigger the exceptional three year limitations period, it [the three year limitations period] would cease to become an exception.” 

Additionally, as to a second plaintiff whose claims were not time-barred, the court held the reclassification did not establish that the employee was misclassified. “The mere fact that an employee was reclassified cannot establish an employer’s liability for the period prior to the reclassification,” the court held, reemphasizing that, under the FLSA, it is the duties that control. In fact, despite the reclassification, the court granted summary judgment to the employer finding the employee was exempt under the computer professional exemption—one of only a handful of cases addressing that exemption. 

While plaintiffs’ counsel will certainly continue to argue that any decision to reclassify is evidence that the employee was previously misclassified, the reclassification decision alone will not, according to the Clarke court, provide evidence of a willful violation or establish that the employee was in fact misclassified in the first place. This decision provides some comfort to employers who decide to reclassify employees, and will permit employers to reclassify employees in cases where the exempt status is unclear with less fear that the decision to reclassify will be used against the company in a lawsuit challenging the original classification decision.     

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Yesterday the United States Department of Labor (DOL) gave another indication that it is preparing to ramp up enforcement efforts, in the form of its We Can Help campaign. We Can Help is designed to educate workers about their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The campaign includes, among other features, a separate website with links to pages explaining the rights of workers and Public Service Announcements in both English and Spanish by Hollywood stars, including Jimmy Smits and Esai Morales. Hilda Solis (Secretary of Labor) and Dolores Huerta (co-founder of the United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO) also recorded PSAs in support of the campaign. 

We Can Help appears to be targeted toward specific industries, i.e., construction, day laborers and farm workers, and clearly reaches out to non-citizens and/or undocumented workers. The campaign’s encouragement of self-action in employee recordkeeping, coupled with the impending media blitz, will likely increase complaints filed with the DOL. To that end, the DOL recently added some 250 additional investigators (a staff increase of approximately 33%), in large part to support this campaign.

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