Supreme Court Declines to Review Drug Reps Classification Issue

Despite the Circuit split created by this month’s decision from the Ninth Circuit, holding that pharmaceutical sales representatives are outside sales employees within the meaning of the FLSA, the Supreme Court has declined to take up Novartis’ appeal of the adverse ruling it received on this issue from the Second Circuit.  The Supreme Court’s ruling was contained in its Order List for February 28, and does not provide any insight into the Court’s thinking. 

Supreme Court Declines Request to Consider Whether Half Time Calculation Is Appropriate Method To Calculate Overtime Due To Misclassified Employees

As previously discussed here and here, several Circuit courts have recently upheld use of the “half time” calculation of damages in FLSA misclassification cases. Urnikis-Negro v. Am. Family Prop. Servs., — F.3d. —, No. 08-3117, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16126 (7th Cir. 2010); Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 702 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2011). In its Order List for February 22, 2011, the Supreme Court denied the employee’s petition for review of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Urnikis-Negro. While this denial means the high court will not provide definitive guidance on this issue, the Circuit courts which have addressed the issue and the Department of Labor all have held the half time method of calculation to be appropriate if the salary paid was intended to cover all hours worked.

Ninth Circuit: Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives Are Exempt Outside Salespersons

On February 14, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held GlaxoSmithKline's pharmaceutical sales representatives (“PSRs”) are exempt from the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime requirements under the outside sales exemption, rejecting a contrary decision from the Second Circuit, and an amicus brief filed by the United States Department of Labor.  Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2834 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2011).  The Ninth Circuit refused to defer to the DOL, finding the amicus brief was merely a new “reinterpretation” of the exemption by the DOL, set forth only in its amicus brief, not in any regulations, and constituted a break from pharmaceutical industry standards regarding what constitutes sales, which the DOL had not objected to since the FLSA’s inception decades ago.   According to the Ninth Circuit, “[i]n this industry, [a] ‘sale’ is the exchange of non-binding commitments between the PSR and physician at the end of a successful call. . . . [F]or all practical purposes, this is a sale.”  Id. at * 35 (emphasis added). 

Based on this Circuit split and the existing split between the Second and Third Circuits over the application of the administrative exemption to PSRs (not at issue in the Ninth Circuit decision), the Supreme Court may be more likely to weigh in on this issue.

We will continue to monitor developments surrounding this evolving issue.

Federal Legislation To Decrease FLSA Tip Credit Proposed

Last Thursday, Donna Edwards (D-MD) introduced a bill to the House of Representatives which would increase the tip credit minimum wage for the first time since 1991.  The Working For Adequate Gains For Employment In Services Act (WAGE Act) would increase the tip credit minimum wage to $3.75/hour under federal law, with subsequent increases culminating in an increase to $5.50/hour after two years.  While the full federal minimum wage for non-tipped workers has increased in recent years, the tip credit minimum wage has remained $2.13/hour since 1991. 

This proposed legislation would increase the wage compensation requirements under federal law.  Of course, these new federal requirements would need to be compared with state obligations, which may impose higher rates as numerous states, including New York, California and Massachusetts, currently do.   

Court Holds Employees Who Handle Internet and Phone Sales Qualify for 7(i) Overtime Exemption

The 7(i) exemption from overtime is not limited to “local” retail or service establishments, and applies to employers who sell nationwide via phone or the internet, a Utah district court has held, rejecting DOL regulations, and finding them antiquated. See Selz v. Invest Tools, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93604 (D. Utah, Jan. 27, 2011). 

Plaintiffs were employed as sales representatives at a call center and were responsible for selling, via phone, products and services to educate individual investors on how to personally invest in exchange markets on-line. In response to a suit for alleged unpaid overtime initiated by sales representatives, the employer moved for summary judgment based on the 7(i) exemption, which applies to employees who earn than 1.5 times the minimum wage, make over 50% of their income in commissions and are employed in a “retail or service establishment.” The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the exemption could not apply because defendant sold their products nationally, not locally, finding the persuasive value of the DOL’s regulations defining a retail or service establishment to be “minimal,” noting they were drafted for the repealed 13(a)(2) exemption formerly applicable to all retail and service employees. The court further noted the regulations have not been updated to reflect the impact of the Internet. “The internet has fundamentally changed what is considered a retail or service establishment and insofar as the Department of Labor regulations do not take this into account, they are not a persuasive interpretation of the FLSA,” the court held.

In evaluating whether the call center was a “retail or service establishment,” the court examined whether the establishment sold goods to the general public, served the everyday needs of the community, was at the end of stream of distribution, and whether it took part in the manufacturing process, all of which the court held were satisfied. Further, the court held even though the employer did not have a physical location accessible by the public, it was accessible via phone and internet and thus, had an establishment available to the public that met its everyday needs. 

While the court granted summary judgment to the employer regarding its status as a “retail or service establishment,” the court denied summary judgment as the applicability of the exemption, finding a fact issue whether the employees earn 1.5 times minimum wage for each hour worked, one of the other requirements needed to establish the exemption.

The case reflects a growing trend of district courts recognizing that Department of Labor regulations defining a “retail or service establishment” are antiquated and are of limited use in interpreting the 7(i) exemption, given the changes in how business is now conducted, particularly through phone sales and the internet. Employees who sell via phone or internet should evaluate the applicability of the 7(i) exemption in light of this decision. Of course, state law also must be consulted.

District Court Finds That Software Company's Technical Consultants Are Exempt "Administrative" Employees

As discussed here and here, the availability of the FLSA’s administrative exemption continues to be a hotly-contested issue in wage and hour litigation. One of the many areas of dispute in applying the exemption concerns whether an employee performs a “production” role (rendering the exemption inapplicable) or an administrative role with duties related to the “general business operations” of the employer. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(2). Last week, a federal district court in Minnesota ruled that three employees who provided consulting services regarding the use and configuration of the Defendant’s enterprise resource planning software satisfied the administrative exemption. See Cruz v. Lawson Software, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8184 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 2011).

Plaintiffs in Cruz were Systems Consultants, Business Consultants and Technical Consultants of Lawson, who all spent approximately 80% of their time travelling to various sites and interfacing with Lawson’s clients regarding implementation of Lawson’s sophisticated software, designed to improve the client’s business operations. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that they were “production line workers” who simply applied rote processes to perform the same task over and over again (in this case, the upgrading of software product), and instead held Plaintiffs were “consulting to assist in configuring the software in order to improve efficiency in whatever particular area they are working in for the client - HR, procurement, etc.”—an administrative task, not a production task. Id. at * 34.   The court determined that the Plaintiffs’ manual work necessary to implement a solution they developed (i.e., installing actual hardware or software) demonstrated the “prominence of the problem solving, planning and purchasing duties” the Plaintiffs performed for Defendant’s clients Id. at * 36. Interpreting DOL regulations, the Cruz court took an employer friendly view in defining Defendant’s “product” as the software suite itself, consistent with the regulation indicating that an employee who performs work relating the general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers is an administrative employee. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(2). Thus, Plaintiffs were not “producers” of Defendant’s product, but rather administrative advisors as to how to best utilize that product. 

The court also concluded that Plaintiffs satisfied the other requirement of the administrative exemption—“the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance”—because they assisted Defendant’s clients with training, troubleshooting and modifications.   Id. at * 38 citing Verkuilen v. MediaBank, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77407 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2010).

This decision provides helpful guidance for businesses whose employees provide services, specifically technology based services, for its customers. However, as this is a fact-sensitive analysis, employers must assess on a case-by-case basis the type of work performed and whether it entails the necessary discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.