Supreme Court Issues Ruling on Oral Complaints of Retaliation, Refuses to Clarify Where Employee Must Complain

While the US Supreme Court recently has rejected petitions for certiorari on key FLSA exemption issues, the highest court in the United States did this term elect to take up the scope of the statute’s protection of workers who make complaints of FLSA violations to their employer.  As discussed in greater detail here, the Court has ruled that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), applies to oral complaints, as well as written ones.  The Court did not decide the related issue of whether such a complaint is protected when made internally, to the employer, or only where it is made to a public agency (such as the Department of Labor).  This ruling does not provide the clarification most had hoped for, but makes clear that a cautious employer will treat all such complaints by an employee as protected activity under the statute.

Vermont Court Holds Cable Installer Received Bona Fide Commissions, But Additional Evidence Needed to Establish 7(i) Exemption

The “retail or service exemption” to the FLSA, sometimes referred to as the “7(i) exemption”, noting the location where it is codified, 29 U.S.C. Section 207(i), has three requirements. While the first requirement, to pay time and one-half the minimum wage for all hours of work, is straightforward, the other two prongs—that an employee receive 50% of his or her income in the form of “bona fide commissions” and that the individual be employed by a “retail or service establishment”—sometimes lead to litigation. Recently, a district court in Vermont addressed these two prongs as applied to a cable installer. 

In Owopetu v. Nationwide CATV Auditing Servs., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24948 (D. Vt. Mar. 11, 2011), the court held that a cable installer working for a subcontractor of the cable provider who was paid a percentage of the amount billed to the provider by the subconstractor received bona fide commissions. The court held a bona fide commission existed because his “ability to earn income fluctuated based upon the volume of customer work orders, he was paid a percentage of the value of each service performed, and he was provided performance-based incentives to increase his income.”   The court relied on several cases that have held a compensation system that creates an incentive to work faster and more efficiently is consistent with the existence of a bona fide commission. It was immaterial that the individual was not engaged in sales.

Nevertheless, the court denied summary judgment because the defendant had not produced evidence regarding whether the plaintiff was employed by a “retail or service” establishment. While the company established that it provided services that are not for resale (installation of cable at customer’s homes), which is one requirement need to satisfy the definition of a “retail or service establishment”, no evidence was presented regarding whether the services are “recognized as retail in the industry,” the other requirement.   The Defendant will have to establish that evidence at trial or seek permission to move for summary judgment on a fuller record.

Chicago Federal Court: Silverware Roller May Participate In Tip Pool

As discussed here, Section 3(m) of the FLSA (like many state laws) places restrictions on which employees within a workforce can receive and share in tips. While the FLSA permits tip pooling “among employees who customarily and regularly receive tips," litigation in the hospitality industry often centers around the legality of tip pool participation by restaurant employees other than the universally-accepted categories of waiters and busboys. On March 7, a Federal District Court in Chicago provided an expansive interpretation of “tipped employee.” Turner v. Millennium Park Joint Venture, LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22295 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2011).

Turner addressed Plaintiff’s contention that, as a server, he should not have been required to contribute $3 from his daily tips to a dedicated “silverware roller,” who rolled silverware into a napkin for place settings. Interestingly, in 2006, prior to Plaintiff’s hire in 2008, the defendant restaurant – Chicago’s Park Grill –held a vote in which the servers unanimously voted to use a silverware roller to do this work in lieu of the servers, and to provide the silverware roller with a portion of their tips. 

Plaintiff argued that an employee could only be one who “customarily and regularly receives tips” if that employee had direct customer contact. Id. at * 6-7. The Court rejected such a narrow reading, interpreting 3(m) to require only what it states: namely that an employee can be eligible for the tip pool “if that employee receives tips, either directly from customers or from other employees who themselves receive direct customer tips, on a regular basis.” The Court further noted that the arrangement with the silverware rollers was voluntary on the part of the servers, and thus did not run afoul of the spirit of DOL regulation 29 C.F.R. § 531.54. The Court provided further practical guidance and observation regarding the appropriateness of tip pool participation by employees assisting servers in the front-of-the-house service enterprise:

in real world terms it is readily understandable that employees receiving tips directly from customers may agree to share tips when they believe that the employees with whom they share help them to serve the customers better and more fully and thus to obtain additional tips and sweeten the pot for everyone. Just so with a silverware roller, who performs work that would otherwise be a waitperson function. Little wonder, then, that the Park Grill servers not only voted for the hiring of such personnel but gave management a standing ovation for acceding to that vote.

Finally, the Court held that Turner’s individual, explicit assent to the tip pool arrangement was not required for it to be upheld as lawful. Rather, “the very nature of the parties' employment relationship is such that no individual employee's separate agreement to the established arrangement was necessary to hold plaintiffs to it. Instead the agreement was implied from the fact of plaintiffs having been hired with that across-the-board understanding in place, in much the same way that an existing collective bargaining agreement binds new  hires into the bargaining unit.” 

Turner is a significant victory for employers operating tip pools which include positions not contemplated by outdated DOL regulations, particularly those within Illinois and the Seventh Circuit.  Hospitality employers – arguably the most popular target for wage-and-hour lawsuits – must continue to be vigilant in assessing their wage and tip practices under the FLSA and state law.

New York Restaurant Litigation Continues...Claims A Casualty?

Despite the recent revised Hospitality Wage Order, the culmination of a multi-year process seeking to bring clarity to the at-times murky wage/hour regulations governing New York restaurants, litigation over these issues continues unabated. This phenomenon was ably remarked upon in a recent New York Times editorial by Zagat’s guide founder Nina Zagat. Now, the most recent installment in this lengthy chapter concerns popular midtown-Manhattan restaurants Alto and Convivio, which have closed recently amidst speculation that the closures are related to a wage lawsuit. Counsel for the restaurants has denied this allegation.

Last August, three individuals who worked as an assistant, food runner and busser, respectively, filed a putative collective and class action against the corporate under the FLSA and New York Labor Law, alleging minimum wage violations under the FLSA, misappropriation of gratuities, failure to pay New York’s “spread of hours” premium and failure to pay the required uniform allowance. In December, District Judge Berman granted Plaintiffs’ request for conditional certification under the FLSA, and permitted the circulation of a notice of pendency inviting “similarly situated” employees to join the lawsuit. Reyes v. Altamarea Group, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139132 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010). Since that time, counsel for the named Plaintiffs has filed approximately a dozen consents to join the case against Altamarea pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 

While the actual basis for the closure decision remains confidential and a mystery, it is certainly no secret that class action wage-and-hour litigation continues to be a, if not the, most prominent legal threat to industry employers in New York state, and there is no substitute for reviewing practices with counsel before they become the subject of litigation.

Appeals Court Rules Advice from Attorney Insufficient To Establish Good Faith Defense

Section 260 of the FLSA provides a defense to liquidated damages where an employer has acted in “good faith.” This test requires both subjective good faith (a belief the employer is proceeding lawfully) and objective reasonableness. A recent appellate decision addresses this second requirement. Mumby v. Pure Energy Servs. (USA), Inc., 2011 U.S. Appl. LEXIS 3460 (10th Cir. Wyo. Feb. 22, 2011). 

In arguing against an award of liquidated damages, the employer asserted it consulted with an attorney who provided basic advice regarding its payment structure and confirmed the legality of it. The record, however, revealed that the attorney did not understand the Company’s compensation structure or the applicable implementing regulation 29 C.F.R. § 778.112. The Court therefore held the good faith defense inapplicable.     

Employers seeking to avail themselves of the Section 260 good faith defense based on advice of counsel must ensure they consult with knowledgeable experience counsel who fully understands the relevant issues. As Mumby demonstrates, slavish reliance on advice of counsel is no defense. 

$130,000 Salary Alone Does Not Make Labor Manager Exempt

In a case exemplifying that salary alone does not make an employee exempt, a district court in Idaho denied summary judgment to an employer in an overtime case brought by a Labor Manager earning $130,000/year. Wood v. Kinetic Sys., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11221 (D. Idaho Feb. 4, 2011).

While it was undisputed the Plaintiff was paid $130,000 on a salary basis, questions of fact remained as to whether the Plaintiff performed primarily non-exempt duties, including working at times as a Project Superintendent, a non-exempt position he had previously held.  Noteworthy in this decision is the Court’s failure to afford any weight based on the employee’s high compensation. Curiously, the Court’s decision contained no reference to exemption to “highly compensated employees,” applicable to those earning more than $100,000 per year, where the duties test is easier to meet. 29 CFR § 541.601.  

Maryland Enacts Rest Break Law for Retail Employers

As discussed in greater detail here, effective March 1, 2011, retail employers with 50 or more employees must provide employees working a consecutive 4-6 hour shift with a 15 minute nonworking break and must provide employees working more than 6 consecutive hours with a non-working break of at least 30 minutes. (if the 30 minute break applies, the employee is not entitled to a 15 minute break) For employees working 8 consecutive hours, employees must be provided with an additional nonworking break of 15 minutes for each additional 4 hours of work on that shift.  For shifts not exceeding 6 hours, the 15 minute break may be waived in writing. See Md.Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. 3-710.

Federal Court Rules Bank of America Is Not "Joint Employer" of Call Center Workers

Businesses that outsource specific functions are often subject to allegations that they are a joint employer of the employees of the outsourced entity. A Pennsylvania District Court recently rejected this theory of liability and dismissed Bank of America from a lawsuit brought by call center employees employed by a vendor servicing Bank of America, who alleged they were not properly compensated for time spent booting up their computers. Lepkowski v. Telatron Mktg. Group, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9388 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2011).

Observing that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (which encompasses Pennsylvania) has not yet ruled on the appropriate legal test to apply to determine “joint employer” status, the court applied factors from the test utilized by the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit. Id. at * 7-10 citing Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., Inc., 355 F.3d 61 (2nd Cir. 2003) and Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983). Because the plaintiffs failed to allege that Bank of America could hire and fire the call center employees, set rates of pay or schedules or maintain employment records, functions all performed by Telatron Marketing Group, Bank of America was dismissed from the case. Id. at * 26-27.

While this decision should be hailed as a victory for companies which outsource call center or other similar functions, the terms and conditions of individuals providing services to a business must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis to assess exposure under the factors identified in Zheng, Bonnette and other appellate authority.