Wage and Hour Law Update : Wage & Hour Lawyer & Attorney : Jackson Lewis Law Firm : Minimum Wage, Overtime & Service Contracts

Of continued concern to governmental agencies – departments of labor, taxing authorities, workers compensation and unemployment boards – is the classification of workers as “independent contractors” and resulting exclusion of (and lost revenue from) such individuals from coverage under tax, benefits and wage statutes. Periodically, such agencies seek to coordinate their enforcement efforts with respect to misclassification, such as the Joint Enforcement Task Force on Employee Misclassification convened in 2007 by former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer. Earlier this month, the Internal Revenue Service and U.S. Department of Labor announced that they have entered into a memorandum of understanding to “improve departmental efforts to end the business practice of misclassifying employees in order to avoid providing employment protections.” The DOL also announced it had reached similar agreements with several state agencies.

This cooperative arrangement was followed shortly by a separate IRS announcement of a new Limited Amnesty Program for underpayments of federal employment taxes due to alleged misclassification. Under this program, an employer is eligible if it is: (a) not currently being audited by any federal or state agency regarding worker classification; (b) has consistently treated the subject workers as non-employees; and (c) has filed all required Form 1099s for the workers for the previous three years. An employer meeting those criteria can, through the program, voluntarily pay 10% of the employment tax liability that may have been due on compensation paid to the workers for the most recent tax year, without any additional interest or penalties. However, the employer must enter into a “closing agreement” with the IRS which, among other provisions, extends the statute of limitations for collecting back taxes (from three to six years) during the first three years following entrance into the program. The tax “amnesty” offered by the program, of course, does not extend to the bevy of other laws potentially applicable to the acknowledged misclassified contractors. 

“Coordination of misclassification enforcement efforts by governmental agencies is not a new concept,” notes Jackson Lewis tax partner Bruce Schwartz. “Unfortunately, none of the agencies has been able to provide a bright line definition for determining whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor and certain laws – for example, unemployment compensation laws – may use a definition of employees that is broader than the common law definition used by the IRS. Nevertheless, businesses should be aware that worker classification determinations made by government agencies usually have the presumption of being correct. Companies need to take this into account determining their business model in using employees and/or independent contractors.” 

These continued government initiatives coupled with the growth of class and collective wage and hour claims based on worker misclassification make it vital for all businesses to closely review their classification process and practices, particularly if contemplating participation in a government “amnesty” program, such as the one outlined above. Simply calling one a contractor, whether the individual requests or agrees to such classification, is not a legal defense, and neither is the participation in a voluntary program applicable to a particular statute. 

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Recently, we discussed the standard applicable to collective action certification of FLSA claims at the so-called “second stage”, which occurs after factual discovery. This is a more stringent standard than that applied to cases at the initial “conditional certification” stage, where courts apply a standard that varies from circuit to circuit, but is typically lenient. However, in a case defended by Jackson Lewis attorneys led by former USDOL Wage and Hour Administrator and current Jackson Lewis Wage and Hour Practice Group Leader Paul DeCamp, Federal Judge J. Phil Gilbert of the Southern District of Illinois recently rejected a plaintiff’s request for conditional certification of a group of store managers. Drew v. Shoe Show, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106503 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2011).

Drew concerned the putative collective action claim of a plaintiff who worked as a store manager for one of defendant’s retail shoe stores in Illinois. She alleged that her primary duties were non-managerial and equivalent to those performed by hourly, non-exempt employees. Specifically, she alleged that she: 1) was not responsible for hiring or firing employees at the store; 2) was not given access to financials and other information relevant to store management; and 3) was subject to intense scrutiny and micromanagement from a district manager, who presided over several stores. In analyzing whether plaintiff’s evidence (which was not supplemented by affidavits of support from other store managers, or other current and former employees) satisfied plaintiff’s obligation to make the “modest factual showing” of a common policy required within the Seventh Circuit and many other courts necessary for conditional certification, the Court noted that in support of her motion, along with her own affidavit, plaintiff pointed only to corporate policies and a job description she believed were applied uniformly across defendant’s store managers.  However, she admitted that her beliefs about store manager duties, other than at her own store, were “based on her limited experience at two or three other [of defendant’s] stores and on several conversations she had with other store managers, but which she cannot recollect with any degree of specificity.” This allegation was further undercut by Defendant’s practice of classifying some store managers as exempt, and others as non-exempt, based on an individual analysis of their duties.

The court concluded that plaintiff had provided “no evidence that, beyond responsibility for those core functions [of store management], all store managers perform similar activities for the same percentage of work time such as they are similarly situated with respect to the question of whether they are properly categorized as exempt under the FLSA.” Absent this showing, the court found that plaintiff failed to meet her burden, and denied conditional certification. 

While defendants in putative misclassification collective actions continue to urge that courts should take the case-by-case, fact-intensive exemption analysis into consideration, many courts continue to permit conditional certification (and notice to putative collective action members) based solely on the affidavit of a named plaintiff alleging a uniformly-applicable job description applied to the duties of all employees holding the position. Employers should consider ease of certification in determining whether to apply a uniform classification to store managers (or any other job title), or to engage in a case-by-case duties analysis before reaching classification decisions. In the same vein, employers should consider the pros and cons of national policies and procedures and job descriptions.

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California, like several other states including Massachusetts and New York, has historically been harsh on employers which abuse the independent contractor designation, classifying individuals who are integrated into their business and function as employees as contractors for the purposes of avoiding tax and wage costs. In fact, Federal Express’ now decade-long battle with courts and agencies over its classification of drivers as independent contractors originates in part from the California state appellate decision in Estrada v. Fedex Ground Package System, Inc., 154 Cal. App. 4th 1 (2007). Now, the California legislature has added a new measure which, barring an unlikely veto, expands misclassification liability further.

Senate Bill 459, passed on September 8, 2011, would make it unlawful for any “person” to willfully misclassify an individual as an independent contractor—not just for a statutory “employer” to do so. This raises the specter of individual liability for misclassifications under the new law. The bill also imposes a penalty of $5,000 to $15,000 for each violation, with escalators to the $10,000 to $25,000 range based on the finding that a given person or company has engaged in a “pattern or practice” of violation. The law also provides that anyone found in violation must post a notice to employees and the public regarding the violation, potentially creating a “ripple effect” for further claims. 

Violations of 459 are predicated on “willful misclassification”, which is defined as “avoiding employee status for an individual by voluntarily and knowingly misclassifying that individual as an independent contractor.” This broad language, with the conjunctive requirements of voluntariness and knowledge, will create ambiguities (and of course litigation) in the wake of the law’s passage as to interpretation of this definition.

The difficult and expensive wage-and-hour compliance environment in California is not news. However, this new enactment, once it receives the likely approval of Governor Brown, would expand exposure both in terms of potentially liable parties (i.e., individuals) and the costs of misclassification. Any entity or individual conducting business in the State of California which has not yet analyzed its classification of workers as contractors is well advised to do so now.

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Pursuant to a 2002 ballot measure, Oregon state law requires an annual minimum wage adjustment to keep pace with inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index. Oregon Labor Commissioner Brad Avakian recently announced that based on the CPI the 2012 minimum wage in Oregon will be $8.80/hour, up from $8.50/hour at present. Oregon is one of several states (including Florida, Washington, Nevada and six others) which ties minimum wage assessment and increases to the CPI.

As the political debate continues to rage regarding the best ways to protect workers and jumpstart the national economy, states will continue to adopt individualized measures, such as tying increases to inflation or (at the other extreme) outright repeal of the minimum wage. Employers must always stay abreast of state law developments in each state in which they operate and ensure compliance with the maze of state wage and hour laws. 

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Confusion continues to reign throughout the federal district courts as to the scope of the administrative exemption as set forth in the regulations at 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.200-202. In a decision highlighting this lack of clarity, Federal District Judge Kevin Castel of the Southern District of New York recently denied cross-motions for summary judgment as to the applicability of the exemption to “research associates” for Gerson Lehrman Group, a company devoted to assisting clients to “find and engage experts in various industries and disciplines.” Cohen v. Gerson Lehrman Group, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104551 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2011).

The parties could agree only that Plaintiffs’ duties as Research Associates related to “interview[ing] clients and match[ing] them with appropriate experts, and perform[ing] research tasks delegated by more senior employees.” Observing that the parties submitted a record “laden with factual disputes,” the Court ruled that while certain disputes were “little more than disagreements about seemingly irrelevant jargon” others were “integral toward determining the application of the administrative exemption.” The Court identified numerous factual disputes relating to the primary duties of Research Associates, and whether they exercised independent judgment and discretion in performing such duties, which in the Court’s view rendered it impossible to determine on summary judgment whether they met the test for the administrative exemption. In short, the Court could not determine whether the duties were exempt duties related to the “general business” of Gerson Lehrman and its clients (and thus potentially eligible for exemption) or were “production” work as defined in Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 2009). Nor could the Court determine whether the requisite discretion and independent judgment was present. 

Cohen, like last year’s sister court decision in Henderson v. Transp. Group, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66109 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2010), highlights the uncertainty in applying the administrative exemption to junior white collar professionals in numerous industries. While these employees have college degrees, possess substantial skills, and often are assigned important client responsibilities, the plaintiffs’ bar asserts that they are simply “producing” the white collar employer’s product, and that, as junior employees, they cannot possibly be involved in decision-making with respect to those clients requiring discretion and independent judgment. Unless and until the Supreme Court provides clarity regarding the scope of the exemption (by addressing one of the Circuit splits developing in particular industries), employers must continue to apply the exemption cautiously after review with counsel and with a full understanding of potential liabilities.

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Disputes regarding the application of the FLSA’s “learned” professional exemption can arise where many – but not all or even “most” – holders of a given position possess specific or substantially-job related academic credentials, but others do not. This is so due to some courts’ narrow interpretation of the learned professional exemption’s requirement that the position require advanced knowledge customarily acquired by a “prolonged course of “specialized intellectual instruction.” With the exception of a few universally-acknowledged professions such as doctors, lawyers and accountants (an industry which itself has been subject to challenge), litigation often centers on whether the requirements for an employer’s specific job are customarily based on academic instruction, or work experience. One such position is that of social worker. Recently, the Ninth Circuit, reversing the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, held that social workers employed by the State of Washington did not satisfy the exemption’s requirements. Solis v. Washington, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18668 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2011).

Washington concerned a challenge to the state Department of Social and Health Services’ (DSHS) classification of its social workers as exempt. The district court agreed with DSHS’ position that the academic credentials of its social workers – who were required to hold a “[b]achelor's degree or higher in social services, human services, behavioral sciences, or an allied field," - were sufficiently specialized and related to their social work to establish the credential and academic instruction as a prerequisite to hold the job of social worker. In the district court’s view, the DSHS requirement that social workers have eighteen months’ social work field experience, along with the imposition of mandatory continuing education requirements, “weighed in favor of a finding of specialized training” and thus exempt status.

Reversing, the Ninth Circuit analyzed Department of Labor opinion letters concerning related positions and observed that “the ‘learned professional’ exemption applies to positions that require ‘a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction,’ not positions that draw from many varied fields. While particular coursework in each of the acceptable fields may be related to social work, DSHS admits that it does not examine an applicant's coursework once it determines that the applicant's degree is within one of those fields.” Id. at * 21 (emphasis in original). Because individuals with diverse academic training could hold the position, based on their professional experience, the Court reasoned that no specialized academic instruction could possibly be a prerequisite for the job. In the Circuit Court’s view, DSHS’ 18-month on-the-job training requirement further militated against exempt status because DOL regulations “state clearly that the exemption does not apply to ‘occupations in which most employees have acquired their skill by experience.’”    

This narrow application of the learned professional exemption creates a dilemma for employers: namely, hire the best candidates to perform a given position, regardless of the source of their superior qualifications, or limit employees hired in job titles classified under the learned professional exemption exclusively to those holding specific narrow degree prerequisites. This concern is underscored in certain professions such as social work by the limited monies provided by funding entities to compensate employees. Absent such a “hard line stance” with respect to this formal requirement, or a very academic, lengthy training program, employers are exposed to a risk of challenge of such a classification.  

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In the latest installment in a long running dispute regarding compensation of certain mid-level managerial employees at the Gristede’s chain of New York-area grocery stores, federal Judge Paul Crotty ruled last week that Gristede’s corporate CEO, John Catsimatidis, is an individually liable “employer” under the FLSA and New York Labor Law. Torres, et al. v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., et al., 04-CV-3316 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2011).  

The Gristede’s litigation, settled on the eve of trial in 2009 but has persisted due to the corporate defendants’ failure to adhere to the payment schedule set forth in the settlement agreement. As the suit was initially filed against numerous corporate defendants and individuals, including Mr. Catsimatidis, the CEO of the operative corporation, Plaintiffs’ counsel renewed its motion to hold Mr. Catsimatidis individually liable when the payment scheduled was not adhered to.  In finding that Mr. Catsimatidis met the test for an “employer” as an individual under the FLSA’s “economic realities” test and the Second Circuit’s decision in Herman v. RSR Sec. Services Ltd., 172 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1999), Judge Crotty relied on undisputed evidence regarding his individual control and involvement in the management of the business, as well as on an affidavit submitted by Mr. Catsimatidis in an unrelated litigation attesting to his operational control of the company as CEO. 

Consistent with the FLSA’s broad, remedial purpose, courts have fashioned tests which seek to hold individuals liable for wages as employers (even without application of the corporate veil doctrine) where they exercise sufficient control and have sufficient authority to warrant imposition of such personal liability. As the Torres decision demonstrates, management of small, medium and large businesses (along with their employment and corporate governance counsel) must be aware of this potential liability, and take steps to ensure wage and hour compliance and minimization of personal risk.

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While this space frequently discusses decisions adjudicating the merits of FLSA plaintiffs’ “off-the-clock” claims, allegations that employees were not compensated for all hours worked, FLSA collective action litigation often does not reach this merits stage of the proceeding. Frequently, courts first review plaintiffs’ claims in the context of determining whether FLSA plaintiffs are “similarly situated” – an elusive and difficult two-stage inquiry. Recently, a federal district court in Pennsylvania analyzed whether a group of some 700+ opt-in plaintiffs in a putative collective action brought against funeral home operator Alderwoods Group were similarly situated. The Court held that they were not. Prise v. Alderwoods Group, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101817 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2011).

Prise concerned claims brought by the named plaintiffs that they, and individuals holding a variety of other non-exempt job titles at defendant’s funeral homes, were not paid for time relating to: “(a) community work; (b) on-call work; (c) overtime preapproval; (d) training for insurance licenses; and, (e) meal breaks.” Id. at * 5.

In analyzing whether all 700 opt-in plaintiffs’ were similarly situated at the second, more stringent stage of the collective action process, the Court reviewed extensive record testimony from numerous plaintiffs across a number of states regarding the similarities and differences in the application of the allegedly “uniform” FLSA policies used by Defendant. This review constituted the required “fact specific review of each class member who has opted-in, taking into account factors such as employment setting, termination procedures, defenses asserted against various plaintiffs, and other procedural issues.” Id. at * 55. This analysis allows the court to consider “1. disparate factual in employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; 2. the various defenses available to defendant which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; and, 3. fairness and procedural considerations.” Id. citing Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir. 2001). 

Under this test, the court concluded, particularly in light of recent Western District of Pennsylvania authority as well as the denial of class certification of similar claims in a California lawsuit against the same Defendant, that “each of the factors reviewed for the classes supports decertification…because [plaintiffs] did not set forth substantial evidence that the opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs. Testimony from sample plaintiffs and management in each class were inconsistent regarding [Defendant’s] compensation practice.” Id at * 86-87.

Prise represents a victory for employers, as the court required the plaintiff to not merely allege a common policy applicable to a broad class of employees, but to adduce evidence through the discovery process supporting such an allegation in order to proceed to trial on a collective action basis. Where plaintiffs failed to do so, the court determined that they could not proceed collectively. Collective action litigation continues to be costly and complex, and employers must continue to take risk management steps to minimize their exposure to FLSA claims, particularly broad collective actions.  

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Last week, the Department of Labor issued proposed amendments to the regulations governing the employment of minors in agricultural occupations, and solicited public commentary on the proposal ahead of a planned public hearing. These proposed amendments, which would not apply to children working on farms owned by their parents, are designed to strengthen the workplace safety requirements for minors working in agriculture, by modifying and expanding the specific occupations deemed “particularly hazardous” within agriculture, bringing those occupations in line with those applicable to to other industries. 29 CFR §§ 570.50-570.68

“These changes are comprehensive,” observes Jackson Lewis partner Craig Roberts, an expert on the DOL’s child labor regulations and enforcement practices. “Now is the time for agricultural employers to review the proposed regulations and voice any objections to them that they may have. The current regulations have been on the books unchanged for over forty years. Once final, the amended regulations will become similarly permanent and will also likely be vigorously enforced by the Department of Labor.” 

Public comments regarding the proposed regulations must be submitted to the Department by November 1, 2011. We will provide further information regarding all DOL initiatives.

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While it is generally understood that decisions of courts apply retroactively (as interpretations of the law) while newly enacted statutes do not (as pronouncements of new law) unless expressly provided by the statutory language, challenges to these principles often arise, especially when the decision or enactment modifies recoverable damages. In a victory for employers, Massachusetts’ highest court ruled last week that the 2008 legislation which created a “treble damages” remedy for violations of the Massachusetts Wage Act applies only to violations which occurred after the statute’s enactment date of July 12, 2008. Rosnov v. Molloy, 2011 Mass. LEXIS 735 (Mass. Aug. 31, 2011). This decision is in accord with a prior federal court decision.  DiFiore v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D. Mass. 2009).

Rosnov concerned an attorney who worked for a separate law office and, after leaving that office, was able to prove at trial that she was entitled to a commission for a referral based on an oral contract.  Following the jury’s verdict, plaintiff argued to the trial court that the treble damages provision should apply even though her claim was brought in 2007 and related to events occurring in an earlier time period. The trial court agreed, and awarded treble damages.  In analyzing the case under the traditional rule regarding retroactivity, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed that “the distinction between legislation that concerns ‘substantive rights,’ and legislation that concerns ‘procedures’ and ‘remedies,’ has proved to be difficult to draw.” Nevertheless, the court ruled that “Absent an express legislative directive to the contrary . . . the mandatory treble damages . . . should not be retroactively applied.” Finding no such express directive, the court held that the provision did not apply to claims accruing before the enactment date of July 12, 2008.   

While this ruling is favorable to employers, and hopefully will inform courts analyzing retroactivity of damages provisions  under other statutes, such as New York’s Wage Theft Prevention Act (and the decisions to date have indicated the statute does not apply retroactively), the harsh reality in Massachusetts is that the treble damages provision remains applicable for wage claims accruing after July 2008, creating significant potential liabilities.

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In keeping with the State’s “Live Free or Die” motto, the New Hampshire legislature last week took the unusual step of repealing the State’s minimum wage law.  This action, supported by Republican legislators seeking to eliminate what they consider “job killing” regulations, has little practical effect, as the repealed New Hampshire minimum wage was harmonized with the federal minimum of $7.25 per hour.  Thus, this repeal only impacts employers not covered by the FLSA, typically limited to small localized businesses operating intra-state with less than $500,000 in annual revenue.  In fact, many New Hampshire lawmakers supporting the bill acknowledged that the repeal was in large part symbolic.

One unclear aspect of the amendment pertains to the use of the tip credit under State law.  The amendment did not repeal New Hampshire’s provision requiring that a tip credit employee receive “a base rate from the employer of not less than 45% of the applicable minimum wage.”  It is unclear whether this provision now can be read to refer to the federal “applicable minimum wage,” or whether New Hampshire law simply defers to the federal requirement.  At present, tip credit employees only must receive $2.13 per hour under the FLSA (less than 45% of the federal minimum wage). 

“While the legislature obviously felt strongly, this change will have little or zero impact on most state employers of size,” observes Debra Weiss Ford, Managing Partner of Jackson Lewis’ Portsmouth, New Hampshire office.  “State employers need to continue to monitor wage/hour compliance, which in many industries is not focused on the minimum wage.” 

Other states are unlikely to follow New Hampshire’s lead, as the trend in most state legislatures, including New York and Massachusetts, has been to expand worker protections. We will continue to advise regarding legislative developments in this area, including the recent Congressional hearings on the efficacy of the FLSA.

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