Wage and Hour Law Update : Wage & Hour Lawyer & Attorney : Jackson Lewis Law Firm : Minimum Wage, Overtime & Service Contracts

As analyzed in more detail  here, the California Supreme Court recently ruled that the California labor code provision prohibiting employers from taking or sharing in tips left for employees by customers – Cal. Lab. Code § 351 (“Section 351”) – does not provide  private litigants with a right to sue their employers directly for alleged misappropriation of tips. Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc., No. S171442 (Aug. 9, 2010). 

In Lu, the defendant casino required card dealers to segregate 15 to 20 percent of their tips, which the casino deposited into a tip pool account for distribution to designated employees who provide services to customers.  Employees who received these segregated tips included chip runners, poker tournament coordinators, poker retention coordinators, hosts, customer service representatives, and concierges.  

The California Supreme Court took up Lu, after both the trial and first appellate court held that Plaintiff Lu had no private right to sue under Section 351, to settle a conflict with another intermediate appellate court which held that a private right of action existed under Section 351. See Grodensky v. Artichoke Joe’s Casino. The court addressed the limited question of whether Section 351 created a private right of action for employees.  Without ruling on the legality of the defendant’s tip pool policy, the Court found no private right of action for employees under Section 351, either explicitly or implicitly. However, the Court observed that employees can still pursue Section 351 relief through the Labor Commissioner, or sue for allegedly misappropriated tips under common law or other statutory theories.

Employers should continue to draft and administer their tip pooling policies carefully, in light of federal and state laws and regulations. This point is underscored by the fact that the FLSA provides a private right of action and 100% liquidated damages plus loss of any taken tip credit for misappropriated gratuities.

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Like many states with state wage and hour laws, the New York Labor Law contains certain unique provisions. One such provision is Section 198-c, which addresses an employee’s right to recover “wage supplements” such as reimbursement for expenses, health, welfare and retirement benefits and vacation, separation or holiday pay.. Section 198-c expressly provides that its provisions shall not apply to any person in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity whose earnings are in excess of nine hundred dollars a week. The New York State Appellate Division, Second Department, reiterated this exclusion this week. Section 198-c’s limitations are a valuable defense for New York employers when defending claims brought by excluded employees for such wage supplements because if such claims are excluded from Labor Law protection, there is no ability for the plaintiff’s counsel to recover attorney’s fees or statutory liquidated damages. See Fraiberg v 4Kids Entertainment, Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 6158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't July 20, 2010). 

The relevant facts in Fraiberg are simple. Fraiberg, the controller of a business that ceased operations, asserted both a contract claim and a Labor Law Claim under Section 198-c for, inter alia, alleged unpaid severance. Affirming the trial court, the appellate court agreed that Fraiberg demonstrated a contractual entitlement to severance. However, reversing the trial court, the Second Department granted summary judgment to the employer on Fraiberg’s claims under Section 198-c for severance, attorneys’ fees and liquidated damages.   The court stated that since plaintiff acknowledged at her deposition that she worked in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity and earned in excess of $900 per week, the defendant “established that…she could not assert a claim [under 198-c] to compel the payment of the severance package.”

While not relevant to the court’s holding, in dicta, the court stated that the New York State Court of Appeals decision in Pachter v. Bernard Hodes Group, Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 609 (N.Y. 2008) stands for the proposition that executives may bring claims for unpaid wages under Article 6 of the New York Labor Law. Article 6, which includes Section 198-c, allows recovery for any unpaid wages not paid per the parties’ agreement as well an award of liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees.   Many read Pachter as merely stating that the deduction from wages provision of Article 6, specifically section 193, applies to executives but that executives generally cannot assert claims for unpaid wages under Article 6.

Like many other states, New York has detailed state wage and hour laws with many nuances. All employers with New York State operations must ensure they recognize obligations and defenses not only under the FLSA but also applicable state laws.

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The surge of state wage and hour claims continues in California. Among the numerous California Labor Code provisions which has been the subject of repeated litigation is California Labor Code § 226(a) (“226”), which creates specific requirements concerning the content of employee wage statements. Included among its provisions is a requirement that wage statements indicate the “total hours worked by the employee, except for any employee whose compensation is solely based on a salary and who is exempt from payment of overtime.” Last month, a California appeals court analyzed this statute in the context of a claim brought by a non-exempt co-manager, who claimed that her wage statements violated this 226 requirement. Morgan v. United Retail, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 1194 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. June 23, 2010).

As recited by the court, the alleged unlawful wage statement contained the following information:

For employees who did not work any overtime hours during the pay period, their wage statements listed the total regular hours worked by the employee, which equaled the total number of hours worked. For employees who worked overtime hours during the pay period, their wage statements separately listed the total regular hours worked and the total overtime hours worked by the employee. However, the statements did not add the regular and overtime hours together and list the sum of those hours in a separate line.

Plaintiff Morgan’s claim, which had been rejected by the trial court on summary adjudication, was that this failure to combine non-overtime and overtime hours and provide a “separate line” indicating total hours constituted a violation of 226. 

The appeals court, after noting that no Court had previously analyzed a wage statement which “separately lists the total number of regular hours and the total number of overtime hours worked by the employee,” reviewed the existing decisions analyzing 226’s “total hours worked” requirement. Observing that the cases finding 226 violations focused on the inaccurate or misleading nature of the wage statements in question (such as wage statements providing an “average” number of hours worked, as opposed to actual hours worked), and citing a recent federal decision dismissing a 226 claim on a similar theory (Rubin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 599 F.Supp.2d 1176 (N.D.Cal. 2009)), the Court held that the failure to provide a separate line with the total hours did not constitute a violation. The Court rejected plaintiff’s contention that a violation occurred because the information provided was insufficient to calculate proper overtime, observing that the plaintiff and other putative class members were paid by the hour, and not on a “salary, commission, or piece-rate basis.”

Morgan provides some much-needed clarity regarding an employer’s obligations under 226. Inclusion of the “separate line” in wage statements (as Morgan indicates United Retail later did), reduces uncertainty and legal risk.  

Wage and hour compliance is a constant struggle due to the need not only to comply with the FLSA but also with all applicable state laws.

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In a decision reiterating important independent contractor issues for employers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals last week reversed a lower court decision holding that certain delivery drivers were properly classified as independent contractors under various provisions of the California Labor Code. Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14279 (9th Cir. July 13, 2010).

At the trial court level, Judge Ronald M. Whyte of the Northern District of California concluded that the drivers, although residents of California providing delivery services in California, were independent contractors under the laws of Texas, the governing law set forth in the drivers’ “Leased Equipment and Independent Contractor Services” agreement with EGL, a nationwide provider of logistics services.  In a footnote, the court further held that “[t]he result would be no different if California law governed.”

Reversing the decision, the Ninth Circuit observed that ‘[w]hether the Drivers are entitled to those benefits [under the Cal. Lab. Code] depends on whether they are employees of EGL, which in turn depends on the definition that the otherwise governing law--not the parties--gives to the term ‘employee’” (emphasis added). The Circuit Court held that the parties’ selection of Texas law to “govern” the contract applied only to disputes about interpretation of the contract (i.e, Texas contract law), not the application of employment statutes like the California Labor Code. Simply put, the Circuit Court held that the drivers’ claims under the Cal. Labor Code did not “arise” from the contract (i.e., did not call primarily for interpretation of that contract) – the contract was simply relevant evidence relating to their claims of employee status.  Finally, the Court reversed Judge Whyte’s ruling that the drivers were independent contractors (even under California law) because, in the Court’s view, he “did not apply the relevant factors [for IC status] identified by the Supreme Court of California to the facts in this case.”

While the Appellate Court’s failure to recognize the choice of law clause may not be relevant to most employers, the central holding and vital takeaway is very straightforward: independent contractor status is generally narrowly construed and currently under intense scrutiny. Further some aspects of the relevant analysis vary not only from state to state but from statute to statute. Additionally, and critically, the intent of the parties as reflected by the parties’ agreement is often of little importance to an administrative agency’s or court’s analysis, as Narayan clearly demonstrates.

All employers, and especially those with multi-state operations, must focus on the propriety of their organization’s use of contractors.   A more detailed analysis of this issue can be found here.

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Employers with New York State operations must ensure they understand the New York State Department of Labor's current position as to new hire notices and wage deductions.

New Hire Notices

As previously reported here, since October 26, 2009, New York state employers have been obligated to notify all new hires in writing of their hourly rate, overtime rate (if applicable) and payday, and receive a written acknowledgment of such notification.  The Department has issued model forms for various types of pay structures, all of which can be found on the Department's website, but continues to advise employers that use of the model forms is not mandatory.   One of the Department's model forms is directed to new hires the employer intends to treat as exempt employees, and both the form and its accompanying instructions require employers to list the exemption applicable to such employees.  However, this form and its accompanying instructions were not fully consistent with the general guidelines for compliance, also posted by the Department on its website.  Such guidelines simply stated that the exemption “should” be listed; it did not make doing so mandatory.  

Recently, the Department modified its general guidelines and now consistently advises that the exemption must be listed for exempt employees on the new hire notice.  In order to comply with the Department’s position, employers must ensure they carefully analyze the appropriate exemption(s) prior to listing them on any notice to ensure such statement is accurate.   It is important to note however that this new directive goes beyond the statutory requirement contained in Section 195 of the Labor Law, although the statute does provide the Department with the right to issue "requirements as to content and form."  

Wage Deductions

In addition to permitting deductions "in accordance with the provisions of any law or any rule or regulation issued by any governmental agency", Section 193 of the Labor Law permits deductions "for the benefit of employee" as long as such deductions are authorized in writing.   Over the years, the Department, through opinion letters, has advised that this language permits deductions for various issues (such as wage overpayments and repayment of loans) as long as the employer obtained written consent and limited such deduction to 10% of gross wages for the payroll period. 

However, since 2006, based on New York State Court of Appeals’ decision in Angello v. Labor Ready, the Department has consistently narrowed its interpretation of the phrase “for the benefit of the employee.”   For example, in a 2007 opinion letter, the Department stated that in order for a deduction “for the benefit of the employee” to be permissible it must be  a deduction which benefits the employee which is also similar to those enumerated in the statute (i.e., insurance premiums, pension or health and welfare benefits, contributions to charitable organizations, payments for United States bonds, payments for dues or assessments to a labor organization). Thereafter, through opinion letters, the Department modified its prior position as to the legality of certain wage deductions, such as a deduction from a final paycheck to cover used but unaccrued paid time off, and deductions for loan repayments and wage overpayments. The Department now states that such deductions are impermissible regardless of the employee's written consent.  Based on the Department's consistently evolving, highly-protectionist pro-employee position, employers should carefully review their wage deduction practices in New York State.

Every business with New York operations should review these wage and hour compliance issues with counsel to ensure compliance.

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As discussed here, Connecticut’s highest court has clarified that discretionary bonuses are not subject to that state’s wage claim statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-72, et seq.  See Ziotas v. The Reardon Law Firm, P.C., SC 18292 (Conn., June 8, 2010). Ziotas concerned a law firm associate employed pursuant to an at-will employment agreement which included a provision for a discretionary bonus. The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s original decision (reversed by the intermediate appellate court on appeal), that because the bonus was discretionary and based on factors other than simply the employee’s performance (such as the firm’s overall performance), it did not constitute “wages” within the meaning of the wage payment statute, even though the employee might be entitled to the same bonus under the contract itself. This decision is consistent with the general legal principle in many states (such as New York, discussed here) that incentive compensation (such as bonuses and commissions) becomes “wages” under the law once that compensation is “earned”. As Ziotas demonstrates, defining the factors used to determine any potential incentive payment as well as any earning criteria is often essential if an employer wishes to keep claims for incentive compensation outside the purview of wage statutes (and the attorneys fees provision often contained therein).

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In Samiento v World Yacht, 10 NY3d 70 (2008), the New York Court of Appeals held that whether a labeled service charge is a “gratuity” for purposes of N.Y. Labor Law § 196-d that must be distributed to service staff depends on the “reasonable customer’s” understanding. One of the many questions unanswered by the decision is whether this standard applies only prospectively to § 196-d compliance following the Court’s February 2008 ruling. In a blow to industry employers, the Appellate Division’s First Department, the intermediate appeals court encompassing Manhattan, has ruled that employers can be subject to liability for undistributed service charges prior to the World Yacht decision. Ramirez v Mansions Catering, Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 4857, 2 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't June 8, 2010). A New York federal court is currently considering the same issue. 

Generally, the question of retroactivity turns on whether a new judicial decision constitutes “the creation of a new legal principle.” Id. at * 1. If it does not, then it is simply an interpretation of the law, and has retroactive application. In Ramirez, the Court observes that the question answered by World Yacht had been acknowledged but, importantly, not answered by the Court of Appeals’ earlier opinion on the same subject. Id. at * 2 citing Bynog v Cipriani Group, (298 AD2d 164 (2002), affd as mod 1 NY3d 193 (2003). Because the legal issue addressed in World Yacht – namely “whether mandatory service charges could constitute "gratuities" under Section 196-d” – had not been resolved previously, World Yacht “was not a departure from existing law” and did not constitute a “new rule.” Id.  This conclusion ignores the fact that the entire industry generally believed that, consistent with federal law, the combination of using the term “service charge” and taxing the collected monies provided an employer with the right to retain the collected monies in whole or in part.

Food service and hospitality industry employers have been focused on this issue for over 2 years. While all such employers should ensure their current practices fully comply with this decision, at least based on this decision, liability can be imposed for periods prior to February 2008 within the 6 year statute of limitations. 

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As recently discussed here¸ a properly drafted commission agreement is essential in New York (and every state) to minimize exposure to a variety of claims, including claims for alleged unpaid commissions and improper wage deductions. In fact, in New York and other states, a written signed commission agreement is required pursuant to state law, absent which adverse inferences can be drawn.

A counter-example to the Swig Equities decision (see discussion linked above), which demonstrated the value of such an agreement, is the recent decision of the New York state trial court in Nichols v. SG Partners, Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 30174U (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 25, 2010). Plaintiffs in Nichols were two former executive recruiters who received a base salary plus commissions. Upon termination they sued to collect alleged outstanding commissions for placements they had made. In their Complaint, they described the employer’s practice in calculating commissions to be to “more or less annually tally the placements made by plaintiffs and make additional payments based upon a percentage of the revenues from the placements.” The employer asserted that no such enforceable oral contract existed, or in the alternative was barred by various defenses to contract formation. 

Because no written contract governed the parties’ agreement regarding, inter alia, when a commission was earned, the Court refused to dismiss as a matter of law Plaintiffs’ claims that the employer breached the oral contract governing payment of commissions. Further, the Court did not dismiss the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the company’s commission payment/reconciliation process constituted an unlawful deduction from wages. Relying on precedent, the Court held that the claim under Section 193 was not duplicative of the claim for breach of contract, even though the claim sought recovery of the same commission compensation. This ruling also revived Plaintiffs’ claims under Labor Law § 198.1-a for a 25% penalty on the owed wages and attorneys’ fees.

Failure to enter into a written commission agreement creates enormous potential exposure for all businesses that employ commissioned staff.

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Reacting to outcry from the employer community, on June 3, 2010 the Miami-Dade County (FL) County Commission amended its recently enacted wage ordinance which defined “wage theft” as failing to pay an employee any portion of his or her wages within 14 calendar days of the work having been performed. Prior to this amendment, the ordinance potentially rendered all semi-monthly pay plans unlawful with respect to covered employees. This amendment will become effective June 13^th unless vetoed by the Mayor. A veto is not expected.

The revised Ordinance provides that it is lawful for an employer to pay wages either:

1. no later than 14 calendar days from the date on which the work was performed, or

2. pursuant to any other pay schedule that an employer has established, by policy or practice, “whereby employees earn and are consistently paid wages according to regularly recurring pay periods.”

The potential penalties for “wage theft” violations, which include back wages, liquidated damages, treble damages based on economic losses resulting from non-payment and costs and attorney's fees, remain unchanged.

More extensive discussion and best practices guidelines regarding the new law are available here.

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In a recent decision, the Honorable Eileen Bransten of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, reinforced to all employers the need to utilized well-drafted commission agreements.  The court considered a claim from a real estate broker alleging that she was not paid commissions and bonuses for sales that she arranged, in violation of her agreement with the employer.   Rejecting her claim, the court pointed to express language in the parties’ agreement stating that the alleged commissions would only have been earned upon a closing and transfer for title, and stated that “parties to a brokerage agreement are free to add whatever conditions they may wish to their agreement, including a condition that the contract of sale actually be consummated before the broker is deemed to have earned his commission.” Root v Swig Equities, LLC, 2010 NY Slip Op 50843U at * 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 10, 2010).   

The court then went further and, while recognizing the general principle that a “seller cannot avoid liability for a broker’s commission based on the non-occurrence of a condition precedent if the seller is responsible for its non-performance”, cited to existing case law and ruled that “[a] broker may choose to agree that even ‘if the sale falls through because of the seller’s fault, he shall be entitled to nothing.” Id.  The court then turned to the plaintiff’s claim for unpaid commissions under the New York Labor Law.   After stating that any Labor Law claim must be premised on a contractual right to recover commissions, the court rejected plaintiff’s labor law claim stating that “without a contractual right to the commissions [plaintiff] seeks to recover, she fails to state a violation of [the Labor Law].” Id. at * 7. 

This decision reinforces to employers the importance of well-drafted commission agreements with specific condition precedents for the earning of commissions.   In fact, in New York, written commission agreements are mandated and the lack of such an agreement not only limits an employer’s ability to defend a claim for unpaid commissions but also creates a presumption that the terms of employment that the commissioned salesperson has presented are the agreed terms of employment. N.Y. Labor Law § 191(1)(c).

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As previously reported in detail here, in November 2009 then-New York Commissioner of Labor Patricia Smith issued an Order accepting the 2009 Restaurant and Hotel Industry Wage Board’s recommendation to consolidate and modify the Wage Orders currently in effect covering New York restaurant and hotel industry employers. The Department however has yet to issue the proposed text of the consolidated Order which, if enacted, would both impose additional obligations on covered New York employers, as well as provide such employers with additional rights and protections, such as:

• Requiring employers to notify affected employees when taking a “tip credit” under the New York Labor Law (the “Labor Law”);
   
• Requiring an additional hour of pay to be provided to all non-exempt employees whose workday is over 10 hours  (the “spread of hours” requirement) regardless of the hourly wage earned by such employees;
   
• Permitting employers to mandate “tip pooling” under the Labor Law – at present, employers may mandate “tip sharing” (where a tipped employees shares his or her tips with supporting customarily tipped employees, such as busboys) but a tip pool, wherein all tips received are pooled and redistributed amongst customarily tipped employees, must be voluntarily; and
   
• Providing a “wash and wear” exemption to an employer’s obligation to provide a laundry cleaning allowance for mandated “uniforms.”

The Department of Labor’s next step is to submit the proposed Order to the State Register for a 45-day public comment period.

Given this uncompleted, mandatory legislative step, and the potential for public comment leading to further discussion and/or revision, it is unclear when a consolidated Order will take effect. However, it is likely that practices will not need be modified until at the earliest well into Summer 2010. We will continue to monitor the status of the Order and provide updates.

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As every California employer knows, wage and hour class actions in California are never-ending.  One basis for many of these class actions has been employers' alleged non-compliance with California meal and rest period requirements.  As to meal periods, the two overriding issues have been whether an employer is required to ensure non-exempt employees take their meal period or just offer such an opportunity and whether such meal period must be taken prior to completion of 5 hours of work.   This issue has significant financial ramifications to California employers as California law imposes a penalty of 1 hour of wages for each day an employee misses a meal period and for each day an employee misses a rest period.  The California Supreme Court is currently reviewing these issues in two consolidated cases and is expected to schedule oral argument in the coming months.  Once oral argument before the court occurs and the court hands down its decision within 90 days thereafter as required by California law, we hope there will be some clarity on these issues.

Robert Pattison, Managing Partner of Jackson Lewis' San Francisco office, has prepared a white paper discussing these issues in detail.  This white paper, which includes a statutory analysis and a discussion of the shifting positions of the State Labor Commissioner, can be accessed at this link. Most importantly, Jackson Lewis suggests that to ensure compliance pending this decision, California employers continue to ensure that no non-exempt employees works more than 5 hours without taking a meal period.

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While the FLSA undeniably provides a plaintiff with the right to assert a statutory claim for unpaid overtime and receive all statutory damages, whether, and under what circumstances, such a claim can be asserted under a state wage and hour law is not always so clear.  In fact, in Maryland, courts had reached conflicting conclusions as to whether such a statutory claim could be asserted in a misclassification or similar case where the claim was not based on an employer's failure to pay promised overtime (i.e., unpaid recorded overtime by a non-exempt employee).  Effective October 1, 2010, this issue is no longer in dispute in Maryland as the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law has been amended to include "overtime wages" within the definition of wages. 2010 Md. ALS 99.  Maryland employers must now recognize that they are potentially subject to both federal and state liability for unpaid overtime.

This enactment highlights the need to analyze all potential wage and hour strategies and liabilities under both federal and state law.

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Employers must not only ensure compliance with the federal minimum wage but also any applicable state minimum wage.  Nevada’s minimum wage is dependent on whether an employer offers qualified health insurance benefits.  Effective July 1, 2010, the Nevada minimum wage increases to $8.25 per hour for employers that do not offer qualified health insurance benefits, and to $7.25 per hour for employees that do offer such benefits.   While the $7.25 rate comports with the FLSA, it is still relevant to Nevada employers as Nevada requires payment of daily overtime if an employee works more than 8 hours in a day and has a regular rate of pay of less than 1½ times the state minimum wage. 

For further information, see Nevada Minimum Wage, Daily Overtime to Increase on July 1 at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/article.cfm?aid=2037. 

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Subsequent to our post of April 6, the California DLSE issued a lengthy new opinion letter regarding trainees, available here. In it, the Division upholds the uncompensated “intern” status of participants in the Year Up program, a program in which a not-for-profit places 18-24 year olds in underserved communities to develop marketable skills in the information technology arena for 6 month assignments. The Division applied the six factor conjunctive test utilized under federal law in reaching its conclusion:

1)  The training, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the employer, is similar to that which would be given in a vocational school;

2)  The training is for the benefit of the trainee

3)  The trainees do not displace regular employees, but work under close observation

4)  The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the trainees and on occasion his operations may actually be impeded

5)  The trainees are not necessarily entitled to a job at the completion of the training period

6)  The employer and the trainees understand that the trainees are not entitled to wages for the time spent in training.

See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993).

The opinion letter departs from the DLSE’s more expansive eleven-factor test, which included the additional factors below, observing that they “do not appear to be based upon any source statute or regulation from which they derive nor are the additional factors identified with specific case law.”

7)       Any clinical training is part of an educational curriculum;

8)       the trainees or students do not receive employee benefits;

9)       the training is general, so as to qualify the trainees or students for work in any similar business, rather than designed specifically for a job with the employer offering the program, i.e. upon completion of the program, the trainees or students must not be fully trained to work specifically for only the employer offering the program;

10)   the screening process for the program is not the same as for employment, and does not appear to be for that purpose, but involves only criteria relevant for admission to an independent educational program, and

11)   advertisements for the program are couched clearly in terms of education or training, rather than employment, although the employer may indicate that qualified graduates will be considered for employment.

While the DLSE’s willingness to abandon these supplemental factors is an encouraging sign, the difficulty of satisfying the original six-factor test remains. Few internship programs, whether offered through the not-for-profit sector or otherwise, are as fully compliant with the prevailing federal test as that offered by Year Up.

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The Supreme Court dealt a blow to New York wage-and-hour defendants sued in federal court last week, overruling established precedent requiring plaintiffs bringing New York Labor Law (“Labor Law”) class actions in federal court to waive the 25% liquidated damages “penalty” in order to proceed on a class basis.  In Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. LEXIS 2929 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2010), the Supreme Court applied the age-old test from Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and held that the state law rule requiring such a waiver is “procedural” as opposed to “substantive”, and has no application in federal court, where opt-out class actions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 

Class action Labor Law plaintiffs in federal court now may seek a 25% penalty in behalf of all class members, increasing the potential class-wide damages.  It remains a divided question, unanswered by the higher courts, as to whether any wage-and-hour plaintiff may recover the 25% penalty and the 100% liquidated damages under the FLSA for the same time period.  Compare Yu G. Ke v. Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 240, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) with Jin v. Pac. Buffet House, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74901 at * 24 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009).

Other states containing class action limitations in their state procedural codes, whose federal courts previously had deferred to the state rule, may now also be subject to class actions in federal court seeking relief under the state’s wage-and-hour laws.   However, the Court did not conclusively state that all such provisions were unenforceable but rather focused its analysis on the intent of the New York provision requiring waiver of penalties.

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In addition to (oftentimes conflicting) state and federal wage laws, employers in particular counties – including such notables as Miami-Dade County (FL), San Francisco County (CA – where the minimum wage of $9.79 is almost $2/hour higher than the state minimum wage) and New York City – must also stay abreast of wage legislation at the county level.  On March 25, New York City Council Member Gale Brewer, along with more than 30 co-sponsors, reintroduced the Earned Paid Sick Leave Act for debate and consideration. In short, the Act would require private employers in the City to provide employees a minimum number of paid sick days each year.  Washington DC and San Francisco already have such laws in place.  Further detail and discussion is available here.

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Federal law merely mandates that employers pay employees as promptly as possible.  State and local laws often require employers to pay wages no less frequently than weekly/bi-weekly/semi-monthly or monthly.  And often these requirements differ based on the type of employees.  For example, in New York, only manual workers need to be paid weekly but most other workers generally need to be paid no less frequently than semi-monthly.

Florida law does not impose any direct pay frequency requirements on employers.  However, the recently enacted Miami-Dade Wage Theft Ordinance requires private sector employers to pay all employees employed in Miami-Dade County within 14 days from the date the employee performed the work, absent a written agreement between the employer and employee extending such time period to 30 days.    Damages for violations (i.e., late payment of wages in excess of $60) are three times the back wages owed, and supervisors can be individually liable for violations.

Employers with multi-state locations must constantly stay abreast of state laws.

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that the FLSA does not restrict employer-mandated tip-pooling arrangements when no tip credit is taken by the employer against the minimum wage obligation.  Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., et al., No. 08-35718 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2010).  Further, the Court rejected the DOL’s regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 531.35, and held that the employees in Woody Woo had no legal right under the FLSA to retain all of their tips, except where the tip credit is taken by their employer. 

In Woody Woo, all tips received by the restaurant went into a “tip pool”, the proceeds from which were redistributed to all employees, including the kitchen staff, who (it is universally understood) are not “customarily tipped” for the purposes of the FLSA in the restaurant industry.  Importantly, all employees received an hourly wage that complied with both federal and Oregon minimum wage laws: again (it can’t be said enough), no tip credit was taken. 

Based on this decision, in states where state wage-and-hour laws track the FLSA (or states with no applicable state wage law), especially those within the Ninth Circuit, employers may want to consider tip pooling arrangement similar to the one addressed by Woody Woo. Where the FLSA is the only statute at issue, Woody Woo stands for the proposition that, provided all employees receive the federal minimum wage (currently $7.25/hour), tips can be collected and redistributed to the entire labor pool, or even potentially kept by management, without violating the FLSA. 

However, in many states, state wage and hour laws expressly  prohibit the construct Woody Woo authorizes. In New York, for example, tip pooling and tip distribution is limited to voluntary pooling among employees who “customarily” receive tips and an employer or its agent cannot retain any tips. N.Y. Labor Law § 196-d.

Finally, even in states with no state law restrictions, common law theories of contract, quantum meruit or unjust enrichment (which are part of most states’ common laws), or statutory theories under consumer protection or business practices statutes can be utilized by employees to attack tip distribution arrangements where any tips are siphoned away from employees engaged in direct service. This concern is underscored if the customer is not explicitly advised that non-service personnel may receive a portion of tips. 

Further discussion of this decision can be found on www.JacksonLewis.com by clicking here.

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The following report is sent to us from Richard I. Greenberg and Felice B. Ekelman

The New York Department of Labor’s 2009 Restaurant and Hotel Industry Wage Board has submitted its Report and Recommendations to consolidate the individual wage orders for the restaurant and hotel industries into a single Hospitality Industry Wage Order.  Commissioner of Labor M. Patricia Smith had convened the Wage Board to recommend changes in the wage and hour regulations that govern restaurant and hotel industry workers following recent modifications to wage rates, gratuities and allowances emanating from the latest increase to the New York minimum wage (see New York Employers Subject to Modified Wage Orders Effective Immediately.

If approved, the September 21, 2009 Wage Board Report and Recommendations would implement many significant changes to existing restaurant and hotel wage orders.  Some of these recommendations are summarized after the jump.

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