Jackson Lewis Team Defeats Conditional Certification In Store Manager Litigation

Recently, we discussed the standard applicable to collective action certification of FLSA claims at the so-called “second stage”, which occurs after factual discovery. This is a more stringent standard than that applied to cases at the initial “conditional certification” stage, where courts apply a standard that varies from circuit to circuit, but is typically lenient. However, in a case defended by Jackson Lewis attorneys led by former USDOL Wage and Hour Administrator and current Jackson Lewis Wage and Hour Practice Group Leader Paul DeCamp, Federal Judge J. Phil Gilbert of the Southern District of Illinois recently rejected a plaintiff’s request for conditional certification of a group of store managers. Drew v. Shoe Show, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106503 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2011).

Drew concerned the putative collective action claim of a plaintiff who worked as a store manager for one of defendant’s retail shoe stores in Illinois. She alleged that her primary duties were non-managerial and equivalent to those performed by hourly, non-exempt employees. Specifically, she alleged that she: 1) was not responsible for hiring or firing employees at the store; 2) was not given access to financials and other information relevant to store management; and 3) was subject to intense scrutiny and micromanagement from a district manager, who presided over several stores. In analyzing whether plaintiff’s evidence (which was not supplemented by affidavits of support from other store managers, or other current and former employees) satisfied plaintiff’s obligation to make the “modest factual showing” of a common policy required within the Seventh Circuit and many other courts necessary for conditional certification, the Court noted that in support of her motion, along with her own affidavit, plaintiff pointed only to corporate policies and a job description she believed were applied uniformly across defendant’s store managers.  However, she admitted that her beliefs about store manager duties, other than at her own store, were “based on her limited experience at two or three other [of defendant’s] stores and on several conversations she had with other store managers, but which she cannot recollect with any degree of specificity.” This allegation was further undercut by Defendant’s practice of classifying some store managers as exempt, and others as non-exempt, based on an individual analysis of their duties.

The court concluded that plaintiff had provided “no evidence that, beyond responsibility for those core functions [of store management], all store managers perform similar activities for the same percentage of work time such as they are similarly situated with respect to the question of whether they are properly categorized as exempt under the FLSA.” Absent this showing, the court found that plaintiff failed to meet her burden, and denied conditional certification. 

While defendants in putative misclassification collective actions continue to urge that courts should take the case-by-case, fact-intensive exemption analysis into consideration, many courts continue to permit conditional certification (and notice to putative collective action members) based solely on the affidavit of a named plaintiff alleging a uniformly-applicable job description applied to the duties of all employees holding the position. Employers should consider ease of certification in determining whether to apply a uniform classification to store managers (or any other job title), or to engage in a case-by-case duties analysis before reaching classification decisions. In the same vein, employers should consider the pros and cons of national policies and procedures and job descriptions.

Federal Court Decertifies Collective Action Alleging Funeral Home Did Not Pay For All Hours Worked

While this space frequently discusses decisions adjudicating the merits of FLSA plaintiffs’ “off-the-clock” claims, allegations that employees were not compensated for all hours worked, FLSA collective action litigation often does not reach this merits stage of the proceeding. Frequently, courts first review plaintiffs’ claims in the context of determining whether FLSA plaintiffs are “similarly situated” – an elusive and difficult two-stage inquiry. Recently, a federal district court in Pennsylvania analyzed whether a group of some 700+ opt-in plaintiffs in a putative collective action brought against funeral home operator Alderwoods Group were similarly situated. The Court held that they were not. Prise v. Alderwoods Group, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101817 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2011).

Prise concerned claims brought by the named plaintiffs that they, and individuals holding a variety of other non-exempt job titles at defendant’s funeral homes, were not paid for time relating to: “(a) community work; (b) on-call work; (c) overtime preapproval; (d) training for insurance licenses; and, (e) meal breaks.” Id. at * 5.

In analyzing whether all 700 opt-in plaintiffs’ were similarly situated at the second, more stringent stage of the collective action process, the Court reviewed extensive record testimony from numerous plaintiffs across a number of states regarding the similarities and differences in the application of the allegedly “uniform” FLSA policies used by Defendant. This review constituted the required “fact specific review of each class member who has opted-in, taking into account factors such as employment setting, termination procedures, defenses asserted against various plaintiffs, and other procedural issues.” Id. at * 55. This analysis allows the court to consider “1. disparate factual in employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; 2. the various defenses available to defendant which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; and, 3. fairness and procedural considerations.” Id. citing Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir. 2001). 

Under this test, the court concluded, particularly in light of recent Western District of Pennsylvania authority as well as the denial of class certification of similar claims in a California lawsuit against the same Defendant, that “each of the factors reviewed for the classes supports decertification…because [plaintiffs] did not set forth substantial evidence that the opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs. Testimony from sample plaintiffs and management in each class were inconsistent regarding [Defendant’s] compensation practice.” Id at * 86-87.

Prise represents a victory for employers, as the court required the plaintiff to not merely allege a common policy applicable to a broad class of employees, but to adduce evidence through the discovery process supporting such an allegation in order to proceed to trial on a collective action basis. Where plaintiffs failed to do so, the court determined that they could not proceed collectively. Collective action litigation continues to be costly and complex, and employers must continue to take risk management steps to minimize their exposure to FLSA claims, particularly broad collective actions.  

Another New York Federal Court Compels Arbitration of Individual Claims

In the Second Circuit, employees generally can waive their right to bring a class or collective action as long as the cost of arbitrating the case on an individual basis is not cost-prohibitive  and does not “remov[e] the plaintiff’s only reasonably feasible means of recovery.”  See In Re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009).   In late March, Judge Gleeson of the Eastern District of New York analyzed the viability of such a collective/class action waiver in the wage and hour context.  The court upheld the waiver finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that individual litigation would be “cost-prohibitive.”  Judge Gleeson rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that incurring arbitration costs of up to $1,500 to process the arbitration rendered the agreement substantively unconscionable.” See Reid, et al. v. Supershuttle International, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26831 (E.D.N.Y. March 22, 2010).

This decision parallels the Southern District of New York’s recent decision in Arrigo v. Blue Fish Commodities Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9547 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2010), in which the court also  dismissed an employee’s Fair Labor Standards Act collective action and required him to arbitrate his claim on an individual basis pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.  See “Federal Courts in New York Continue to Enforce Arbitration Agreements” http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/article.cfm?aid=1989 for a further discussion of this decision and other recent New York federal court decisions addressing mandatory arbitration.