Wage and Hour Law Update : Wage & Hour Lawyer & Attorney : Jackson Lewis Law Firm : Minimum Wage, Overtime & Service Contracts

29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3) prohibits employer retaliation against an employee for complaints alleging FLSA violations (though the contours of what constitutes a protected complaint are still uncertain).  An unanswered question has been whether the FLSA’s anti-retaliation protections prohibit a prospective employer from considering an applicant’s FLSA activity arising out of previous employment?  Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that such protections do not so extend, and that a prospective employer may consider such prior activity in making a hiring decision.  Dellinger v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16635 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011).

In Dellinger, plaintiff applied for employment with defendant SAIC.  After a contingent offer of employment was made, plaintiff disclosed to SAIC, in connection with the company’s required background check, her pending FLSA lawsuit alleging minimum wage and overtime violations against a previous employer.  The offer of employment subsequently was rescinded by SAIC.  Dellinger sued, alleging that the withdrawal was based on her disclosure of her FLSA activity, and that such an employment decision violated Section 215(a)(3)’s prohibition against retaliation by an employer “against any employee.”

In a two-to-one decision, with a dissent from Circuit Judge Robert King, the Appellate Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, ruling that the scope of the anti-retaliation provision was defined by the FLSA’s definition of an “employee,” contained in 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).  Analyzing applicant Dellinger’s claims under this definition –“any individual employed by an employer” –the Court held that “Dellinger could only sue [SAIC] if she could show that she was an employee and that Science Applications was her employer.” Dellinger, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16635 at * 8 (emphasis added).  In declining to broaden the scope of “employee” for Dellinger, the Court observed that the “core” purpose of the FLSA was to provide minimum wage and overtime protection to workers, and that permitting FLSA lawsuits from applicants on such a novel theory would impermissibly and inappropriately broaden the statute, even though “‘morally unacceptable retaliatory conduct’ may be involved.”

While Dellinger is a positive development for employers, specifically those located in the Fourth Circuit, making employment decisions based on an applicant’s prior attempt to assert his or her workplace rights and protections (as opposed to based on legitimate business criteria such as the qualifications of the applicant) remains fraught with legal risk. 

For further analysis of this decision by Jackson Lewis see here.

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As FLSA and other wage lawsuits continue to be prevalent, one threshold issue that often arises with small and/or local businesses, as well as non-profit entities, is whether the employer is an enterprise covered by the FLSA. This issue is relevant because in order for the FLSA to be applicable, either the individual employee must be engaged in interstate commerce (individual coverage) or the defendant employer must be an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce (enterprise coverage). Enterprise coverage is triggered where an employer: 1) "has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person"; and 2) has at least $500,000 of "annual gross volume of sales made or business done." 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A).

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit  analyzed the applicability of enterprise coverage in six consolidated cases brought against employers who asserted they were local businesses not covered by the FLSA. In its decision, the court clarified what constitutes “goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce” for purposes of establishing enterprise coverage. Polycarpe v. E & S Landscaping Serv., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18171 (11th Cir. Fla. Aug. 31, 2010). 

Specifically the court held that whether the employees, who performed different jobs for the several defendants, including “landscapers, security-system technicians, and construction workers, among other [occupations]”, were covered by the FLSA turned on whether they used any materials in conducting their employers’ business which had shipped in interstate commerce. Materials, held the court, should be read for FLSA purposes to mean “tools or other articles necessary for doing or making something.” The court specifically rejected the so-called “coming to rest” doctrine, wherein goods or materials shipped in interstate commerce ceased to be identified as such once they “come to rest within a state before intrastate purchase by a business.” The court reversed the dismissals at the district court level, remanding five of the six the cases for application of its “materials” test.  The sixth case was affirmed based on uncontroverted evidence that the employer did not meet the $500,000 annual revenues test. 

While a highly technical decision, Polycarpe stands for a very straightforward proposition: FLSA enterprise coverage (at least in the Eleventh Circuit based on the court’s definition of “materials”) is broad. Employers with $500,000 in gross revenues within the Circuit (encompassing Florida, Georgia and Alabama) must carefully analyze potential FLSA liabilities. 

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