Federal Circuit Court: Corporate Parent Not "Joint Employer" of Subsidiaries' Assistant Managers

Plaintiffs in FLSA litigation often file suit against additional entities and parties beyond their primary or W-2 employer. One common allegation is that the corporate parent of an employing subsidiary is a “joint employer.” This can impact not only which entities are liable for any FLSA violation (where a joint employer relationship is found), but also the scope of any class or collective action, as the corporate parent is alleged to be the joint employer of not only one subsidiary, but all. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has rejected one such sweeping allegation, upholding a District Court finding that the corporate parent of Enterprise Rent-A-Car’s operating companies (Enterprise Holdings, Inc.) was not a “joint employer” of assistant managers employed by the 38 operating subsidiaries. In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Empl. Practices Litig., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 13229 (3d Cir. 2012).

In Enterprise, plaintiffs alleged that Enterprise Holdings exercises control over the policies of the 38 subsidiaries (including employment policies) and thus over assistant managers across the 38 subsidiaries, all of whom (plaintiffs urged) should be included in a single massive collective action lawsuit alleging misclassification as exempt. In affirming the District Court’s rejection of this theory, the Third Circuit articulated for the first time the standard it will apply to determine if there is joint employment under the FLSA, namely whether: “1) the alleged employer's authority to hire and fire the relevant employees; 2) the alleged employer's authority to promulgate work rules and assignments and to set the employees' conditions of employment: compensation,  [*18] benefits, and work schedules, including the rate and method of payment; 3) the alleged employer's involvement in day-to-day employee supervision, including employee discipline; and 4) the alleged employer's actual control of employee records, such as payroll, insurance, or taxes.” The Court then observed that there was no evidence that “Enterprise Holdings, Inc.'s actions [in recommending policies or practices to the subsidiaries] at any time amounted to mandatory directions rather than mere recommendations,” and, thus, no evidence to support a joint employer finding under any of the factors it identified as relevant to the analysis.

Enterprise is a welcome victory for Third Circuit employers (those in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware), especially those utilizing a similar corporate structure while simultaneously seeking to limit FLSA (and other employment liability) to individual subsidiaries. Corporate parents, franchisors and other non-operating entities exerting any business influence over operating corporations must continue to use discretion in their directives to those entities and those entities’ employees, to avoid assertions that the level of control exerted is distinguishable from the level found to exist in Enterprise.

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Magistrate Judge Rules Brooklyn Church Not an FLSA "Enterprise"

Determining whether an entity is covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act is not an easy analysis. One basis for jurisdiction is "enterprise coverage."

On March 3, Magistrate Judge Azrack of the Eastern District of New York ruled on summary judgment that St. Augustine’s Episcopal Church of Brooklyn is not an “enterprise” for purposes of the FLSA, and accordingly dismissed FLSA claims asserted by a former on site caretaker and custodian. Locke v. St. Augustine's Episcopal Church, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18749 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2010). In reaching this decision, Magistrate Azrack first declined to treat the church and the Diocese of Long Island (which was not named separately as a defendant) as a single enterprise. The court then focused its analysis on whether St. Augustine’s secular activities (principally, hosting functions and renting an apartment to the plaintiff at a below-market rate) rendered it an enterprise engaged in commerce.

Distinguishing Boekemeier v. Fourth Universalist Soc'y, 86 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985)), the court ruled that “The undisputed facts show that St. Augustine's does not perform rental activity as a ‘business operation on the side.’” Id. at * 27. Unlike in Boekemeier and Alamo, the limited rental of St. Augustine’s function hall space (which the church did not advertise or maintain a staff to service and promote) did not make St. Augustine’s an enterprise because the church did not compete with commercial establishments, and the income earned was not substantial. Based on this analysis, the Court held that “Locke has not met the burden of establishing that St. Augustine's performed any activities for a business purpose. St. Augustine's does not constitute an enterprise.”
 

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