Connecticut District Court Upholds Collective Actions Waivers, Orders Individual Arbitrations

While courts continue to issue varied rulings regarding the appropriateness of collective action certification in FLSA litigations, employers continue to attempt to limit exposure to such broad allegations through several mechanisms. One of these strategies is inclusion of class/collective waiver provisions in arbitration, employment or separation agreements. Such provisions bar initiation and participation in class or collective claims. The enforceability of such waivers in arbitration agreements recently received a boost from the Supreme Court, which held a California rule which presumptively invalidated such waivers contained in arbitration agreements to be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744, 179 L. Ed. 2d 742 (2011). 

In one of the first rulings issued applying Concepcion, a Connecticut federal court upheld a class and collective action waiver contained in an arbitration agreement, forcing two of the three named plaintiffs in the lawsuit (which seeks unpaid wages on behalf of a class of exotic dancers) to arbitrate their claims on an individual basis. D'Antuono v. Serv. Rd. Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57367 (D. Conn. May 25, 2011). D’Antuono is being defended by Jackson Lewis attorneys including Detroit partner Allan Rubin and Wage/Hour Practice Group head Paul DeCamp

The Plaintiffs in D’Antuono were exotic dancers who performed at Defendant clubs pursuant to independent contractor agreements. These agreements provided for the leasing of space within the club by the dancer, and provided that any claims arising under the arrangement between the parties be submitted to individual arbitration. In holding that the two Plaintiffs in D’Antuono who were parties to the agreement at issue were required to submit their claims to individual arbitration (a third Plaintiff was not party to a signed agreement), the Court considered Plaintiffs arguments that the agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable – i.e., that the agreement was formed under unlawful conditions, and that the terms of the agreement itself were unlawful. 

Addressing the former, the Court held that the waiver provision – which was prominently located on page four of the four-page document, above the signature block – was not hidden from Plaintiffs, and that the unequal bargaining power between the parties did not render it “procedurally unconscionable.” As to the latter, the Court rejected the Plaintiffs’ contention that such arbitration would be “prohibitively expensive”, thus requiring invalidation of the agreement. This ruling was made possible in part by Defendants’ agreement not to enforce provisions of the agreements which could drive up expenses (such as the potential shifting of defendants’ attorneys fees to plaintiff if unsuccessful). Citing earlier Connecticut authority, the Court held that Plaintiffs’ claims were large enough to warrant pursuit on an individual basis, and thus the class or collective action mechanism was not necessary to recovery, particularly since the Plaintiffs could recover separate attorneys fees in the contemplated arbitration, just as if proceeding before the Court. Id. citing Pomposi v. Gamestop, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1819 (D. Conn. Jan. 11, 2010).

D’Antuono highlights the potential use of arbitration agreements with class/collective action waiver provisions to avoid class/collective claims. Employers should consider arbitration agreements, as well as numerous other risk-reducing mechanisms, in consultation with counsel to minimize exposure to claims, particularly in areas where class exposure is prevalent.    It is vital to note however that while Concepcion provides high court support for the class waiver concept in the arbitral setting, the law as to the enforceability of such waivers outside of the arbitration context is more unsettled.

[UPDATE]  On June 7, 2011, the Court in D'Antuono granted Plaintiffs' request to certify its Order for interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  D'Antuono v. Serv. Rd. Corp., 11-CV-33, Dkt. Entry 62 (D. Conn. June 7, 2011).  In granting Plaintiffs' request, the Court observed that, in light of Concepcion, "there is now a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the continuing validity of the federal common law of arbitrability doctrines on which Plaintiffs rely" and that the "continuing validity of those doctrines . . . are . . . controlling questions of law." 

[UPDATE]  On August 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied Plaintiffs’ request for an interlocutory appeal of the ruling compelling arbitration, finding “an immediate appeal is unwarranted.”  D’Antuono et al. v. Service Road Corporation, et al., Case No. 11-2451 at Dkt Entry 17 (2d Cir. Aug. 8, 2011).

Court Allows Counterclaim To Set Off Fees Paid To Independent Contractors Alleging Misclassification

When an independent contractor alleges s/he was misclassified and seeks alleged unpaid minimum wage and overtime, a significant issue is whether a prevailing plaintiff can receive a windfall.  Simply put, can an independent contractor alleging misclassification under the FLSA (or state law) keep fees for services already collected, and also collect a damages award for unpaid minimum wage and overtime?  In one recent decision, a federal judge has found the answer to be “not necessarily”.  Doe v. Cin-Lan, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16447 ( E.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2010)(Note: Jackson Lewis partner Allan Rubin represents Cin-Lan in this matter).

Cin-Lan concerns the classification of exotic dancers as independent contractors at a Michigan nightclub.  The named Plaintiff entered into an independent contractor arrangement under which she danced at the defendant club in exchange for a portion of “dance fees” collected from patrons; the balance of the dance fee went to the club.  The club did not pay Plaintiff minimum wage or overtime, though she often collected dance fees at a rate approaching $75/hour.  Significantly, the parties’ agreement called for the dance fees to serve as an offset to any wage liability if Plaintiff were ever found to be an employee. 

In rejecting Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim, the Court first rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the contract itself was “repugnant to the FLSA” and thus invalid.  The Court further observed that “the parties agreed that if there was ever a legal determination that their business relationship was in fact an employment relationship, then the alternative provisions of the [contract] would apply to define the parameters of that relationship. The counterclaim alleges that Doe agreed to such an arrangement” and therefore the Court declined to reject such an arrangement as a matter of law.  Finally, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that all “dance fees” should be re-characterized as tips for purposes of the FLSA (and thus not credited against wages owed). 

While this decision is based on a very-specific fact pattern involving dancers in the nightclub industry, it highlights the importance and value of a well-drafted independent contractor agreement.  Even if such agreement does not support the independent contractor classification, potentially it can limit damages.