Ninth Circuit: California Wage Claims Do Not Usurp Public Utility Commission's Jurisdiction

As we recently discussed, interplay between state wage-and-hour laws and other statutes (federal or state) is not always seamless, as neither the state wage statute nor the competing law or regulation at issue properly addresses the extent to which their scope might interfere with each other. However, as employment statutes, the wage-and-hour laws are often construed broadly, and some courts are reluctant to limit their scope regardless of the presence of another statute. In a recent example of this judicial reticence, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a trial court decision finding that a district court could not adjudicate plaintiffs’ state wage-and-hour law claims against SuperShuttle because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Kairy v. SuperShuttle Int'l, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22161 (9th Cir. Nov. 3, 2011).       

Plaintiffs, “franchisee” van drivers for SuperShuttle in California, allege they were misclassified as independent contractors for the purposes of various provisions of the California Labor Code. The trial court applied a three-part test laid out by the California Supreme Court to resolve conflicts potentially implicating the jurisdiction of Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”). The trial judge determined that: 1) the PUC had authority to formulate policy regarding the classification of all drivers for so-called passenger stage corporations (“PSCs”), including SuperShuttle; 2) the PUC had exercised such authority by issuing a General Order relating to PSC conduct, and a decision interpreting that order; and, accordingly 3) that to allow plaintiffs’ wage action to proceed would interfere with this regulation of PSC drivers. Id. at 6-7. In reversing, the appellate court acknowledged that the PUC had authority to regulate the relationship between a PSC, such as SuperShuttle, and its drivers, and that it was a “close” question as to whether the General Order issued by the PUC constituted an exercise of this authority. However, the appellate court ruled that application of the wage/hour laws would not interfere with the PUC regulations governing drivers. Thus, the Public Utilities Code was “not implicated, and the district court retains subject matter jurisdiction over this case.”

Public sector employers, and all businesses performing work for public sector entities, must closely analyze the interplay of employment statutes and the regulatory environment governing their particular industry.

Magistrate Judge Rules Brooklyn Church Not an FLSA "Enterprise"

Determining whether an entity is covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act is not an easy analysis. One basis for jurisdiction is "enterprise coverage."

On March 3, Magistrate Judge Azrack of the Eastern District of New York ruled on summary judgment that St. Augustine’s Episcopal Church of Brooklyn is not an “enterprise” for purposes of the FLSA, and accordingly dismissed FLSA claims asserted by a former on site caretaker and custodian. Locke v. St. Augustine's Episcopal Church, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18749 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2010). In reaching this decision, Magistrate Azrack first declined to treat the church and the Diocese of Long Island (which was not named separately as a defendant) as a single enterprise. The court then focused its analysis on whether St. Augustine’s secular activities (principally, hosting functions and renting an apartment to the plaintiff at a below-market rate) rendered it an enterprise engaged in commerce.

Distinguishing Boekemeier v. Fourth Universalist Soc'y, 86 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985)), the court ruled that “The undisputed facts show that St. Augustine's does not perform rental activity as a ‘business operation on the side.’” Id. at * 27. Unlike in Boekemeier and Alamo, the limited rental of St. Augustine’s function hall space (which the church did not advertise or maintain a staff to service and promote) did not make St. Augustine’s an enterprise because the church did not compete with commercial establishments, and the income earned was not substantial. Based on this analysis, the Court held that “Locke has not met the burden of establishing that St. Augustine's performed any activities for a business purpose. St. Augustine's does not constitute an enterprise.”