Courts Decertify Collective Actions Based On Auto-Deduct Claims, Citing Individualized Issues

As we have repeatedly discussed, use of a so-called “auto-deduct”, wherein a predetermined amount of time is automatically deducted from an employee’s hours of work to correspond to a meal period with the understanding that the employee will perform no work during that period, can give rise to individual or class claims that an employee has in fact performed some work during that period on one or more days, rendering the time compensable. This is particularly so in professions such as health care or security services, where the need to provide assistance, however fleeting, can create an instance of arguable “work” any time the employee remains on the premises. Often, employees assert such claims as putative collective action claims, alleging a systemic practice of requiring or allowing employees to perform work during these meal break periods, and then automatically deducting the time from hours of work. In a pair of new decisions, two different district judges in Pennsylvania have decertified such collective actions against Pennsylvania hospitals, finding at the close of discovery that the putative collective action plaintiffs had failed to establish similarity between their claims: i.e., they failed to establish that the employer had a “policy or practice” of allowing such work to be performed and to go uncompensated. Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146067 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2011); Kuznyetsov v. West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146056 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2011).

In these cases, the employers were able to establish through a combination of documentary and deposition evidence that they had adequate safeguards in place to ensure FLSA compliance. These safeguards included policies and practices which require the recording of all hours of work, and a mechanism (of which the employees were duly advised) for reporting any instance of work outside the scheduled time or during a meal break, which would otherwise be automatically deducted and thus not paid. In Camesi, the court observed “Ms. Camesi received training regarding [defendant]'s meal break cancellation policies, and pursuant to those policies, she was paid for working through meal breaks at least five times . . . [she] testified that her supervisor would not have been aware of whether she had worked through unpaid meal breaks, and she never complained to any superior about working through meal breaks and not being paid.” Thus, the hospital did not “suffer or permit” Plaintiff to work through lunch without pay if and when she performed work during lunch without availing herself of the policy, as she alleged.

While these are positive decisions, they were only obtained after significant litigation.  Employers must closely balance the administrative convenience attendant to such a practice with the heightened risk that an FLSA violation will occur or be alleged. Employers should adopt such policies with due care and at the least even if such policies are adopted ensure there are clearly communicated mechanisms for employees to report that they worked during such otherwise uncompensated periods. 

Detroit Federal Court Rejects Employee's Attempt To Seek Recovery Based on Auto-Deducted Meal Break

In this post, we discussed two different courts’ analyses of hospital plaintiffs’ attempts to seek conditional certification of their claims that they were not paid for allegedly working meal periods due to the employers’ use of an auto-deduct for meal periods. In an opinion addressing such a claim on the merits (as opposed to the lower standard applicable to determining appropriateness of conditional certification of an FLSA collective action), a  Detroit federal court rejected, on summary judgment, such an assertion. Deppen v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78247 ( E.D. Mich. July 19, 2011).

In Deppen, the plaintiff nurse anesthetist claimed that the use of an auto-deduct for meal breaks, coupled with the fact that supervisors recorded employees’ time, demonstrated that she was not paid in a compliant fashion for 30 minute meal periods deducted per shift. After observing that defendant had demonstrated there were numerous work weeks where plaintiff either: 1) did not work over 40 hours (thus had no claim for gap time under the FLSA as discussed in this post); or 2) was overpaid for time she did not work, the court went on to determine the plaintiff had failed to “meet her burden showing that she performed substantial duties and spent her meal time predominantly for [the hospital’s] benefit.” Id. at *18 citing Myracle v. General Electric Co., 1994 U.S. App LEXIS 23307 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 1994). The court further observed there was “adequate staffing to cover the patient caseload and allow the OB CRNA’s to take their meal breaks.” 

Wage/hour plaintiffs continue to regularly allege that automatic, systemic practices, such as an auto-deduct for meal periods or payment based on a set schedule such as 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m, run afoul of the FLSA and applicable state laws. While potentially defensible, such policies and practices will always expose employers to greater risk of an allegation that wages paid did not correlate to actual hours of work. Employers should scrutinize such practices closely, and take additional measures to ensure compliance as necessary.

Federal Court Finds Time Spent On-Premises On-Call During Lunch Breaks Non-Compensable

The FLSA requires that employers pay employees for all work time, as well as for any time that the employee is “engaged to wait.”  An employee is “engaged to wait” when the employee is idle, but is constrained with respect to engaging in personal activities. Thus, the employee’s time is deemed to be “for the benefit” of the employer.  Examples may include time spent waiting to respond to on-site incidents, monitoring a work location, or maintaining a presence in a particular area for public safety reasons,. When the employee is deemed free to pursue personal interests, the employee is “waiting to engage”, and need not be compensated. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa recently issued a decision analyzing and applying the  “engaged to wait” concept to lunch breaks in regard to security employees required to remain on-premises and on-call during their meal period.

Aiken v. Catholic Health Initiatives, No. 4:07-cv-018, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79782 (S.D. Iowa 2010), concerned private security guards who worked on the premises of defendant’s hospitals.   The security guards were  allotted 30 minute unpaid meal breaks pursuant to defendant’s written policy and practice. However for the duration of this break they were required to: (1) remain on-premises; (2) carry their hospital radios;, and (3) respond to any incidents or assignments in the hospital, should they arise. If a security guard was unable to take a full thirty-minute meal break during his/her shift due to an incident, the employee was instructed to notify their supervisor so that they could be paid for the entire thirty-minute period. The security guards sought compensation for these unpaid meal periods under the FLSA

The court held that the security guards were not “engaged to wait” during this time, but rather were free to pursue personal interests, such as making personal calls, playing card games, and surfing the Internet, and therefore their meal breaks were not compensable. Although the court acknowledged that the employer derived some benefit from the security guards’ “deterrence value” when they remained on premises—especially considering that each hospital had only one security guard per shift—it nonetheless found that the “predominant benefit” of the meal break fell to the employees themselves. 

Interestingly, the security guards argued that they were free to pursue personal activities during extensive “down time” during their compensable work hours, and therefore the activities pursued during “working time” and during the meal breaks were indistinguishable and, thus, equally compensable. The court flatly rejected this argument, finding such time was plainly not work, even if the employer chose to compensate for such personal time during the actual workday. 

In rejecting Plaintiffs’ claims and holding that neither 1) the potential to have to perform work nor 2) the actual performance of work on an occasional basis converted all meals breaks to compensable time, the court did note that if the security guards’ meal breaks were interrupted with a high level of frequency then the meal breaks could potentially be considered working time. However, the interruptions here were too infrequent to rise to that level, and regardless employees were paid whenever they notified their supervisors of a meal break interruption,. 

Employers who wish to require employees to remain on-call during meal periods must be cautious of state laws and ensure that any such on-call time does not regularly restrict employees from engaging in personal activities.