Wage and Hour Law Update : Wage & Hour Lawyer & Attorney : Jackson Lewis Law Firm : Minimum Wage, Overtime & Service Contracts

In a decision reiterating important independent contractor issues for employers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals last week reversed a lower court decision holding that certain delivery drivers were properly classified as independent contractors under various provisions of the California Labor Code. Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14279 (9th Cir. July 13, 2010).

At the trial court level, Judge Ronald M. Whyte of the Northern District of California concluded that the drivers, although residents of California providing delivery services in California, were independent contractors under the laws of Texas, the governing law set forth in the drivers’ “Leased Equipment and Independent Contractor Services” agreement with EGL, a nationwide provider of logistics services.  In a footnote, the court further held that “[t]he result would be no different if California law governed.”

Reversing the decision, the Ninth Circuit observed that ‘[w]hether the Drivers are entitled to those benefits [under the Cal. Lab. Code] depends on whether they are employees of EGL, which in turn depends on the definition that the otherwise governing law--not the parties--gives to the term ‘employee’” (emphasis added). The Circuit Court held that the parties’ selection of Texas law to “govern” the contract applied only to disputes about interpretation of the contract (i.e, Texas contract law), not the application of employment statutes like the California Labor Code. Simply put, the Circuit Court held that the drivers’ claims under the Cal. Labor Code did not “arise” from the contract (i.e., did not call primarily for interpretation of that contract) – the contract was simply relevant evidence relating to their claims of employee status.  Finally, the Court reversed Judge Whyte’s ruling that the drivers were independent contractors (even under California law) because, in the Court’s view, he “did not apply the relevant factors [for IC status] identified by the Supreme Court of California to the facts in this case.”

While the Appellate Court’s failure to recognize the choice of law clause may not be relevant to most employers, the central holding and vital takeaway is very straightforward: independent contractor status is generally narrowly construed and currently under intense scrutiny. Further some aspects of the relevant analysis vary not only from state to state but from statute to statute. Additionally, and critically, the intent of the parties as reflected by the parties’ agreement is often of little importance to an administrative agency’s or court’s analysis, as Narayan clearly demonstrates.

All employers, and especially those with multi-state operations, must focus on the propriety of their organization’s use of contractors.   A more detailed analysis of this issue can be found here.

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The Ninth Circuit recently revised and reissued its earlier opinion in Rutti v. Lojack Corp., No. 07-56599 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2010), holding upon further review that the Plaintiff’s commuting time is compensable under California law, while continuing to find that such time  is not compensable under the FLSA. The Court did not change its ruling that time spent on the required post-shift activity at issue in the case – the daily transmission of data – was compensable.

The Plaintiff, an automotive technician, installed and repaired vehicle recovery systems for the employer. Because technicians perform most of their duties at the clients’ locations, the employer required Plaintiff to use a company-owned vehicle to travel to clients’ sites. The employer prohibited technicians from carrying passengers in the company vehicles and from using the vehicles for personal business. The technicians also were required to keep their cell phones on while driving.

The employer paid Plaintiff on an hourly basis for the period beginning when he arrived at his first job and ending when he completed his final job, but not any commuting time. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all technicians, sued the employer to recover compensation for commuting time and for alleged preliminary and post-shift activities.

Addressing Plaintiff’s claim that the commuting time should be compensable under California law, the Court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the employer. California law requires that employees be compensated for all time “during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer.” Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 578 (2000). In Morillion, the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were “subject to the control” of their employer during a mandatory bus commute because “plaintiffs could not drop off their children at school, stop for breakfast before work, or run other errands requiring the use of a car.” The California Supreme Court reasoned the “[p]laintiffs were foreclosed from numerous activities in which they might otherwise engage if they were permitted to travel to the fields by their own transportation.”

Similarly, in Lojack, Plaintiff was required to drive the company vehicle, could not stop off for personal errands, could not take passengers, was required to drive the vehicle directly from home to his job and back, and could not use his cell phone while driving, except to answer calls from the company dispatcher. Accordingly, the Court found that “Plaintiff was under Lojack’s control while driving the Lojack vehicle en route to the first Lojack job of the day and on his way home at the end of the day.” Thus, the Court held that his commute was compensable under California law.

Employers that provide company vehicles and have restrictions regarding their use should expect increased challenges to their policies and claims that employees’ commutes are “compulsory,” rather than ordinary.  A more detailed analysis of the  Lojack decision is available here.

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that the FLSA does not restrict employer-mandated tip-pooling arrangements when no tip credit is taken by the employer against the minimum wage obligation.  Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., et al., No. 08-35718 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2010).  Further, the Court rejected the DOL’s regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 531.35, and held that the employees in Woody Woo had no legal right under the FLSA to retain all of their tips, except where the tip credit is taken by their employer. 

In Woody Woo, all tips received by the restaurant went into a “tip pool”, the proceeds from which were redistributed to all employees, including the kitchen staff, who (it is universally understood) are not “customarily tipped” for the purposes of the FLSA in the restaurant industry.  Importantly, all employees received an hourly wage that complied with both federal and Oregon minimum wage laws: again (it can’t be said enough), no tip credit was taken. 

Based on this decision, in states where state wage-and-hour laws track the FLSA (or states with no applicable state wage law), especially those within the Ninth Circuit, employers may want to consider tip pooling arrangement similar to the one addressed by Woody Woo. Where the FLSA is the only statute at issue, Woody Woo stands for the proposition that, provided all employees receive the federal minimum wage (currently $7.25/hour), tips can be collected and redistributed to the entire labor pool, or even potentially kept by management, without violating the FLSA. 

However, in many states, state wage and hour laws expressly  prohibit the construct Woody Woo authorizes. In New York, for example, tip pooling and tip distribution is limited to voluntary pooling among employees who “customarily” receive tips and an employer or its agent cannot retain any tips. N.Y. Labor Law § 196-d.

Finally, even in states with no state law restrictions, common law theories of contract, quantum meruit or unjust enrichment (which are part of most states’ common laws), or statutory theories under consumer protection or business practices statutes can be utilized by employees to attack tip distribution arrangements where any tips are siphoned away from employees engaged in direct service. This concern is underscored if the customer is not explicitly advised that non-service personnel may receive a portion of tips. 

Further discussion of this decision can be found on www.JacksonLewis.com by clicking here.

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