Wage and Hour Law Update : Wage & Hour Lawyer & Attorney : Jackson Lewis Law Firm : Minimum Wage, Overtime & Service Contracts

As the volume of FLSA lawsuits remains high, the frequency of collective action trials – once unheard of – has correspondingly increased. On January 5, 2012, following a bench trial, Judge Edmund Sargus, Jr. of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled that 91 current and former “special investigators” for defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company were exempt from minimum wage and overtime under the FLSA’s administrative exemption. Foster, et al. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1384 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 5, 2012).

In the Court’s lengthy Order, the Court summarized the evidence presented at trial and applied it to the most commonly disputed component of the administrative exemption test -  whether the investigators’ work required the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. In making such determination, the Court first sought, consistent with FLSA jurisprudence and guidance, to define the investigators’ “primary duty” in their work for Nationwide. The Court ultimately identified the primary duty “conduct[ing] investigations into suspicious claims with the purpose or goal of resolving indicators of fraud present in those claims.” In coming to this conclusion, the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ assertion that their primary duty was to “investigate suspicious claims by gathering and reporting facts” as too “narrow”, since it failed to account for the resolution of fraud indicators in the conduct of an investigation.

This distinction made all the difference to the Court’s ultimate determination, namely that the investigators exercise discretion and judgment because they were “tasked with resolving indicators of fraud” and had “nearly unilateral discretion in referring claims to law enforcement and the [National Insurance Crime Bureau].” In regard to resolving fraud indicators, the Court noted that “‘truth’ is not an entirely objective concept” and the investigator’s decision required factual determinations, the reaching of which “necessarily requires judgment and discretion.” This discretion was “significant” because in making factual determinations the investigators had “undisputed influence on Nationwide's decisions to pay or deny insurance claims.” These investigators were thus unlike the investigators addressed in other recent FLSA opinions.

The insurance industry has a decade-long history of misclassification claims involving investigators, adjusters and other “white collar” employees, as exemplified by Foster (a complaint from 2008). Misclassification litigation continues to weigh on employers, and the risks of such litigation should be considered by all counsel, business leaders and risk managers in determining classifications and formulating and refining underlying business models. 

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On December 23^rd, President Obama signed the $1 trillion omnibus spending act, which set the Labor Department budget at $14.5 billion for fiscal year 2012. This constitutes a $145.4M increase (approximately 1%) from 2011. The bill, which prevented any government shutdown from occurring, places five restrictions on U.S. Department of Labor activities during the funded period. These are:

1)      A prohibition on DOL implementation of the H-2B wage rule for temporary nonagricultural workers;

2)      A prohibition on implementation or enforcement of DOL’s proposed “coal dust” rule -- a proposed rule to lower miners' exposure to respirable coal dust in all underground and surface coal mines –until an independent assessment of DOL’s process giving rise to the rule is conducted;

3)      Continued exempt classification of service technicians at auto dealerships from overtime requirements under the FLSA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10) for DOL enforcement purposes;

4)      A freeze on the Department’s proposed development of a musculoskeletal disorders reporting requirement (aka the “ergonomics regulation”); and

5)      A prohibition on the implementation of electronic voting procedures in representation elections before the National Labor Relations Board.

This funding, and these fairly narrow concessions limiting USDOL activity, ensures the continuation of active Department enforcement heading into the election year.

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In recent weeks, we have discussed challenges to FLSA exempt status brought by employees many might assume to be properly exempt, such as a Director for the Red Cross. In another recent rejection of a claim of this type brought by the the aggressive plaintiffs’ bar, a federal court in Pennsylvania has ruled, following a bench trial, that the Supervisor of the Toxicology Laboratory for Wilkes-Barre Hospital properly was classified as an exempt "learned" professional.  Hockenbury v. Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co., LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141001 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2011).

Judge Edwin M. Kosik found that Plaintiff Hockenbury, who supervised fifteen technologists in the lab, possessed the requisite “educational degree and expertise in toxicology” to qualify as a learned professional under 29 C.F.R. § 541.301 (e)(1). The Court also concluded that Plaintiff was paid on a salary basis because he conceded that “he received in every single pay period the minimum of eighty hours pay, which was never reduced based on the number of hours he worked.”

Hockenbury represents another employer victory in a single FLSA plaintiff’s challenge to his or her exempt status. However, such scattered district court cases do little to alleviate the continued threat of FLSA litigation, and nothing to obviate the need for position-specific analysis of FLSA classification by all employers. In general, to qualify for the “learned” professional exemption, in addition to being paid on a salaried or fee basis, the employee must have a specific job-related advanced degree that is necessary for the performance of the job. State law also must be reviewed as some states, such as California, impose higher standards for exemption. 

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Assisting Lady Gaga with her day-to-day needs may be a dream to many, but does it make one exempt from overtime pay? Under DOL regulations, an administrative assistant who is paid on a salaried basis and exercises significant independent discretion and judgment is exempt under the "administrative exemption." 29 CFR § 541.203(d). This is the same exemption that applies to others who exercise significant independent discretion and judgment in performing "office or non-manual" work (as demonstrated by regulation 541.203), such as certain Human Resources employees. Challenges to the applicability of the exemption to executive or personal assistants are not new; the fact that the individual being assisted is a prominent professional in his or her industry is not determinative. Some courts applying the DOL’s regulation have expressed reluctance to rule that well-compensated individuals providing such assistance do not exercise "discretion and independent judgment, but case law remains unclear. See   Seltzer v. Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)(executive assistant to president of defendant investment bank qualified for exemption); Malena v. Victoria's Secret Direct, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121320 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2010)(denying summary judgment as to whether defendant's good faith belief that executive assistants performed exempt work precluded liability).

In a new challenge, a former personal assistant to chart-topping entertainer Lady Gaga has filed suit, alleging that she essentially worked around the clock in exchange for a fixed salary, and thus did not receive hundreds of thousands of dollars in premium overtime pay due under the FLSA and state law. O'Neill v. Mermaid Touring Inc., Civil Case No. 11-9128 (Southern District of New York, Dec. 14, 2011)(Jones, J). 

Employers and individuals retaining personal or executive assistants to perform similar services should be aware of the employment risks associated therewith. At the least, in addition to ensuring such employee is paid on a salaried basis, the employer must ensure that the assistant utilizes independent discretion in judgment in performing job duties.

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The proliferation of FLSA lawsuits brought by “non-exempt” employees for alleged uncompensated working time has highlighted several important FLSA questions. One prominent and thorny question concerns when and how an employer is deemed to have constructive knowledge of work allegedly performed by an employee, such that the employer will be deemed to have “suffered or permitted” that work, rendering such work compensable time. Often, employers are frustrated by this broad and unclear standard, which may entitle employees to compensation even when no member of management was aware that work was being performed. In a new decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has identified circumstances under which an employer is not obligated to compensate the employee for such hours. Kellar v. Summit Seating Inc., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24745 (7th Cir. Dec. 14, 2011).

Kellar concerned a sewing manager for Defendant who claimed that she regularly arrived at Summit's factory “between 15 and 45 minutes before the start of her 5:00 a.m. shift.” She characterized her activities upon arrival as follows:

about 5 minutes unlocking doors, turning on lights, turning on the compressor, and punching in on the time clock. Then she prepared coffee for the rest of Summit's employees, which took her about 5 minutes. Depending on her workload, she spent 5 to 10 minutes (or longer) reviewing schedules and gathering and distributing fabric and materials to her subordinates' workstations, "so that they could go straight to work, rather than waiting for [her] to bring [fabric] to them." For another 5 minutes, she drank coffee and smoked a cigarette. The remaining time was spent performing "prototype work" (preparing models for production), cleaning the work area, or checking patterns.

Id. at * 2-3. Plaintiff conceded that “no one told her that she needed to come in before her shift, but she arrived early because it would have been "a hassle" to show up at 5:00 a.m. and still get her subordinates up and running close to the start of their 5:00 a.m. work shifts.” Id. Plaintiff sometimes punched in early (as was common among Defendant’s employees), but when she forgot to do so she would write the “official” shift start time on her timesheet (i.e., 5 a.m.), and she did not complain at any time that her paycheck failed to capture her hours of work. 

The lower court held _that plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for the alleged pre-shift work, and she appealed to the Seventh Circuit. For purposes of the appeal, the parties did not dispute whether or not these activities took place (as typically is disputed). The legal questions before the court were simply: (1) whether these activities were “preliminary” and thus excludable from hours of work under the FLSA on that basis; (2) whether this time was “de minimis” and thus not compensable; and, (3) whether defendant had the aforementioned knowledge necessary to render this work compensable under the FLSA. 

After answering the first two questions in the negative, ruling that these activities would constitute compensable work if Defendant had suffered or permitted them, the court rejected Plaintiff’s claims. The Court observed that Plaintiff, as a manager, was aware of and at times enforced Defendant’s policy of forbidding unauthorized overtime, and participated in weekly meetings discussing the upcoming week’s schedule. The Court further noted that Plaintiff’s early punch-ins did not constitute notice to the employer of pre-shift work because early punching was a common practice at Defendant’s place of business, and “clocking in early would not necessarily have alerted Summit that Kellar was performing pre-shift work. Id. at * 17 citing 29 C.F.R. § 785.48.   Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that “[management] had little reason to know, or even suspect, Kellar was acting in direct contradiction of a company policy and practice that she herself was partially responsible for enforcing. Accordingly, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Summit had reason to know that Kellar was working before her shift.” Id. at * 19. 

The “suffer or permit” standard remains a relatively broad one, which can render employee activities compensable even if members of management or others with authority are not expressly aware of the activities at the time they are performed. Kellar provides valuable instruction to employers (particularly those within the Seventh Circuit’s reach, encompassing Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin) in crafting FLSA-compliant policies for application to non-exempt employees. With that said, all employers should carefully scrutinize timekeeping and wage payment policies to avoid disputes of this ilk. 

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Quantifying the necessary “discretion and independent judgment” required to qualify for the administrative exemption continues to divide courts, and the conclusion is often in the eye of the judicial beholder. This is especially so where discretionary authority must be measured without reference to monetary benchmarks or limits, such as those applicable to insurance adjusters or purchasing agents. See Roe-Midgett v. CC Servs., 512 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2008)(insurance adjusters with sufficient discretion to approve claims qualified for exemption); see also 29 CFR § 541.203(f)(regarding purchasing agents). With that said, USDOL regulations and district courts interpreting the exemption have identified certain duties (often varying by industry) which constitute the hallmark of such discretion. In a new decision, one federal judge in New York State rules that a Director of Emergency Services for the Red Cross met this test. Raffe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137340 (N.D.N.Y Nov. 30, 2011).

Plaintiff Raffe challenged the applicability of the exemption via the common technique of citing the repeatability of certain processes integral to his job, despite admitting “to having significant budgetary and fiscal responsibilities, including reallocation of emergency services funds, submitting grant applications, handling procurement, overseeing equipment and inventory, and authorizing purchases” (id. at * 37) and further admitting to “developing  and evaluating the [Red Cross] Chapter's Continuity of Operations Plan.” Id. at * 37-8. Plaintiff argued that his consultation with (and obtaining the approval of) the Chapter’s Executive Director or Board prior to the implementation of major decisions undercut his discretion and independent judgment. Rejecting this argument, the Court rightly observed that “[t]he fact that Raffe did not have sole or final authority to make decisions does not disqualify him from satisfying the conditions necessary for the administrative exemption.   Id. at * 38 citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(c). Because Raffe also met the other prongs of the administrative exemption test (including being paid on a salary basis), he qualified for exemption from minimum wage and overtime. 

Raffe is a positive result for employers in New York and the other jurisdictions within the Second Circuit, but also highlights the reality that director-level employees such as Raffe can mount expensive legal challenges to their exempt classification. The potential direct and indirect costs of such challenges must be factored into employers’ classification decisions and risk management plans.   A full understanding of the current judicial view of the scope of exemptions within each region in which each organization operates is vital to fully understand all potential risks.  

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As we reported here, the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor previously announced it would propose a rule regarding the applicability of the companionship exemption to the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime requirements. This longstanding exemption was the subject of a rare Supreme Court opinion on FLSA issues, in which the Court upheld the exemption's historic application to individuals employed by third party agencies who provide care in a private home. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007). According to news reports, Labor Secretary Hilda Solis will announce the Department's rulemaking proposal today. 

If enacted, the proposed rules will likely eliminate or eviscerate the exemption, bringing many if not most home health aides and other domestic workers within the ambit of FLSA protection. This regulatory change would pose difficult fiscal challenges to individuals who require such services on a regular, sometimes round-the-clock basis, and to agencies which are in the business of providing such services to Medicare or Medicaid-eligible individuals, and which are reimbursed for providing those services at a fixed rate.

Industry employers should review the proposed rule closely and prepare to participate in the mandatory 60-day notice and comment period which will follow its announcement, as the comment period will provide the employer community with its first and likely best opportunity to influence the rule. 

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The Supreme Court's web site confirms that the nation's highest court has granted the petition for certiorari filed by the pharmaceutical sales representative (PSR) plaintiffs in Christopher et al. v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation.  The Court will now review the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Christopher that SmithKline properly classifies its pharmaceutical sales representatives as "outside sales" employees, despite the FDA regulations precluding PSRs from receiving money from the medical practitioners they visit.  Absent unforeseen delays, the parties (and the industry at large) should expect a ruling prior to end of the Court’s 2011/2012 term. 

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The highly technical requirements of the FLSA’s learned professional exemption often result in findings that employees traditionally considered to be professionals are non-exempt. In order to satisfy the exemption, the employee must utilize advance knowledge that is “customarily acquired through prolonged academic instruction” when performing their primary duties In a new decision highlighting this analysis (as well as its deviation from the “common sense” understanding of a learned professional), Judge Michael Telesca of the Western District of New York applied the exemption on summary judgment to a funeral director. Rowe v. Olthof Funeral Home, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118182 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2011).

Plaintiff Rowe served as a licensed funeral director for defendant for four years. Prior to becoming so employed, Plaintiff completed a one year residency with defendant in conjunction with his obtaining his license from New York State. His primary duties included “removing bodies of deceased persons from the locations of their deaths, transporting bodies to [defendant’s premises], embalming bodies, dressing embalmed bodies and placing them in caskets, and cremating bodies.” The parties dispute hinged upon interpretation of a DOL regulation stating that “licensed funeral directors and embalmers who are licensed by and working in a state that requires successful completion of four academic years of pre-professional and professional study, including graduation from a college of mortuary science…generally meet the duties requirements for the learned professional exemption.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(e)(9). Plaintiff contended that “because the State of New York requires only an Associates’ degree to become a licensed funeral director, funeral directors in New York are not exempt [under this regulation].” The court rejected a formulaic application of the “four year” guideline contained in this regulation, instead observing that the proper determination of exempt or non-exempt status turned upon “the duties performed by plaintiff in the course of his employment, and [a determination of] whether the duties performed are those of a learned professional.” Id. at *10.  The court then ruled that plaintiff’s primary duties, as discussed above, required the use of the advance knowledge Rowe acquired through his academic background and licensing process. 

Rowe represents a win for employers particularly in the funeral home community, as the court rejected a draconian reading of the exemption requirement as set forth in the DOL regulations. Employers applying the learned professional exemption must continue to ensure that advanced knowledge in a field of science or learning is a prerequisite to perform the work, not simply a preference.  The absence of a specific job-related degree can doom the exemption argument.

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Enterprise coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act is broadly defined, seeking to include in its expansive definition of FLSA covered employers substantially all businesses with greater than $500,000 in gross revenues which have “employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or that have employees “handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1).   Even local businesses arguably falling outside this definition can be subjected to protracted legal proceedings under the FLSA, in which coverage is the initial focus of the dispute. A recent decision issued by Judge James C. Cacheris of the Eastern District of Virginia. Rains v. E. Coast Towing & Storage, LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106915 (E.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2011) is instructive as to the analysis and scope of “enterprise coverage.”.

Rains concerned the FLSA overtime claim of a plaintiff tow truck driver for defendant East Coast Towing & Storage, LLC, a company towing vehicles within Virginia. Because plaintiff produced “specific evidence suggesting that East Coast Towing had employees handling and working on goods and materials that had been moved in or produced for commerce”, including “truck[s] that had been manufactured outside . . . Virginia,” whether the business was a covered enterprise under the FLSA turned on the “revenue” prong of the enterprise coverage test, namely whether Defendant’s gross volume of sales was greater than $500,000 in any given year. In moving for summary judgment on the issue of coverage, Defendant produced tax returns for the years 2008 and 2009, as well as a Statement of Revenue and Expenses for 2010 indicating annual receipts between $201,322 and $428,176, along with an affidavit from the company’s owner stating that the company had never made more than $500,000. Plaintiff sought to rebut this evidence with testimony from himself and two other former employees which purported to estimate the average number of vehicles towed per day by Defendant, and the average amount charge per tow. Plaintiff asserted that, based on the figures at the lowest end of the range demonstrated by this evidence, Defendant had annual revenue of approximately $684,375. 

The court found this conflicting evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to Defendant’s annual revenues, and rejected Defendant’s argument that plaintiff could not possibly have had personal knowledge of the number of vehicles towed during shifts when he was not working, based on his assertion that he had “constant interaction with East Coast Towing as a small company, and [was] one of only three night time staff.” The court also rejected Defendant’s attack on the supporting affidavit of one of the other employees which questioned the sufficiency of that employee’s knowledge of the amount Defendant received per tow, and further observed that the affidavit indicated the employer’s preference for accepting cash payments (evidence tending to indicate that Defendant’s “official” tax evidence did not encompass all revenue for purposes of the FLSA test). 

While some small businesses truly are not FLSA-covered under the enterprise coverage test, such “local” entities can still be subject to legal proceedings seeking to apply the FLSA’s provisions to their business, as Rains demonstrates. Further, businesses can be subject to FLSA suits from employees who are covered by the Act due to their individual involvement in commerce. And, of course, many state wage-and-hour laws provide broader coverage than the FLSA. Employers of all sizes, and particularly non-profit organizations, should analyze whether they are subject to coverage under the FLSA and/or applicable state laws.

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Recently, we discussed the standard applicable to collective action certification of FLSA claims at the so-called “second stage”, which occurs after factual discovery. This is a more stringent standard than that applied to cases at the initial “conditional certification” stage, where courts apply a standard that varies from circuit to circuit, but is typically lenient. However, in a case defended by Jackson Lewis attorneys led by former USDOL Wage and Hour Administrator and current Jackson Lewis Wage and Hour Practice Group Leader Paul DeCamp, Federal Judge J. Phil Gilbert of the Southern District of Illinois recently rejected a plaintiff’s request for conditional certification of a group of store managers. Drew v. Shoe Show, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106503 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2011).

Drew concerned the putative collective action claim of a plaintiff who worked as a store manager for one of defendant’s retail shoe stores in Illinois. She alleged that her primary duties were non-managerial and equivalent to those performed by hourly, non-exempt employees. Specifically, she alleged that she: 1) was not responsible for hiring or firing employees at the store; 2) was not given access to financials and other information relevant to store management; and 3) was subject to intense scrutiny and micromanagement from a district manager, who presided over several stores. In analyzing whether plaintiff’s evidence (which was not supplemented by affidavits of support from other store managers, or other current and former employees) satisfied plaintiff’s obligation to make the “modest factual showing” of a common policy required within the Seventh Circuit and many other courts necessary for conditional certification, the Court noted that in support of her motion, along with her own affidavit, plaintiff pointed only to corporate policies and a job description she believed were applied uniformly across defendant’s store managers.  However, she admitted that her beliefs about store manager duties, other than at her own store, were “based on her limited experience at two or three other [of defendant’s] stores and on several conversations she had with other store managers, but which she cannot recollect with any degree of specificity.” This allegation was further undercut by Defendant’s practice of classifying some store managers as exempt, and others as non-exempt, based on an individual analysis of their duties.

The court concluded that plaintiff had provided “no evidence that, beyond responsibility for those core functions [of store management], all store managers perform similar activities for the same percentage of work time such as they are similarly situated with respect to the question of whether they are properly categorized as exempt under the FLSA.” Absent this showing, the court found that plaintiff failed to meet her burden, and denied conditional certification. 

While defendants in putative misclassification collective actions continue to urge that courts should take the case-by-case, fact-intensive exemption analysis into consideration, many courts continue to permit conditional certification (and notice to putative collective action members) based solely on the affidavit of a named plaintiff alleging a uniformly-applicable job description applied to the duties of all employees holding the position. Employers should consider ease of certification in determining whether to apply a uniform classification to store managers (or any other job title), or to engage in a case-by-case duties analysis before reaching classification decisions. In the same vein, employers should consider the pros and cons of national policies and procedures and job descriptions.

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Confusion continues to reign throughout the federal district courts as to the scope of the administrative exemption as set forth in the regulations at 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.200-202. In a decision highlighting this lack of clarity, Federal District Judge Kevin Castel of the Southern District of New York recently denied cross-motions for summary judgment as to the applicability of the exemption to “research associates” for Gerson Lehrman Group, a company devoted to assisting clients to “find and engage experts in various industries and disciplines.” Cohen v. Gerson Lehrman Group, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104551 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2011).

The parties could agree only that Plaintiffs’ duties as Research Associates related to “interview[ing] clients and match[ing] them with appropriate experts, and perform[ing] research tasks delegated by more senior employees.” Observing that the parties submitted a record “laden with factual disputes,” the Court ruled that while certain disputes were “little more than disagreements about seemingly irrelevant jargon” others were “integral toward determining the application of the administrative exemption.” The Court identified numerous factual disputes relating to the primary duties of Research Associates, and whether they exercised independent judgment and discretion in performing such duties, which in the Court’s view rendered it impossible to determine on summary judgment whether they met the test for the administrative exemption. In short, the Court could not determine whether the duties were exempt duties related to the “general business” of Gerson Lehrman and its clients (and thus potentially eligible for exemption) or were “production” work as defined in Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 2009). Nor could the Court determine whether the requisite discretion and independent judgment was present. 

Cohen, like last year’s sister court decision in Henderson v. Transp. Group, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66109 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2010), highlights the uncertainty in applying the administrative exemption to junior white collar professionals in numerous industries. While these employees have college degrees, possess substantial skills, and often are assigned important client responsibilities, the plaintiffs’ bar asserts that they are simply “producing” the white collar employer’s product, and that, as junior employees, they cannot possibly be involved in decision-making with respect to those clients requiring discretion and independent judgment. Unless and until the Supreme Court provides clarity regarding the scope of the exemption (by addressing one of the Circuit splits developing in particular industries), employers must continue to apply the exemption cautiously after review with counsel and with a full understanding of potential liabilities.

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In the latest installment in a long running dispute regarding compensation of certain mid-level managerial employees at the Gristede’s chain of New York-area grocery stores, federal Judge Paul Crotty ruled last week that Gristede’s corporate CEO, John Catsimatidis, is an individually liable “employer” under the FLSA and New York Labor Law. Torres, et al. v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., et al., 04-CV-3316 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2011).  

The Gristede’s litigation, settled on the eve of trial in 2009 but has persisted due to the corporate defendants’ failure to adhere to the payment schedule set forth in the settlement agreement. As the suit was initially filed against numerous corporate defendants and individuals, including Mr. Catsimatidis, the CEO of the operative corporation, Plaintiffs’ counsel renewed its motion to hold Mr. Catsimatidis individually liable when the payment scheduled was not adhered to.  In finding that Mr. Catsimatidis met the test for an “employer” as an individual under the FLSA’s “economic realities” test and the Second Circuit’s decision in Herman v. RSR Sec. Services Ltd., 172 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1999), Judge Crotty relied on undisputed evidence regarding his individual control and involvement in the management of the business, as well as on an affidavit submitted by Mr. Catsimatidis in an unrelated litigation attesting to his operational control of the company as CEO. 

Consistent with the FLSA’s broad, remedial purpose, courts have fashioned tests which seek to hold individuals liable for wages as employers (even without application of the corporate veil doctrine) where they exercise sufficient control and have sufficient authority to warrant imposition of such personal liability. As the Torres decision demonstrates, management of small, medium and large businesses (along with their employment and corporate governance counsel) must be aware of this potential liability, and take steps to ensure wage and hour compliance and minimization of personal risk.

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In keeping with the State’s “Live Free or Die” motto, the New Hampshire legislature last week took the unusual step of repealing the State’s minimum wage law.  This action, supported by Republican legislators seeking to eliminate what they consider “job killing” regulations, has little practical effect, as the repealed New Hampshire minimum wage was harmonized with the federal minimum of $7.25 per hour.  Thus, this repeal only impacts employers not covered by the FLSA, typically limited to small localized businesses operating intra-state with less than $500,000 in annual revenue.  In fact, many New Hampshire lawmakers supporting the bill acknowledged that the repeal was in large part symbolic.

One unclear aspect of the amendment pertains to the use of the tip credit under State law.  The amendment did not repeal New Hampshire’s provision requiring that a tip credit employee receive “a base rate from the employer of not less than 45% of the applicable minimum wage.”  It is unclear whether this provision now can be read to refer to the federal “applicable minimum wage,” or whether New Hampshire law simply defers to the federal requirement.  At present, tip credit employees only must receive $2.13 per hour under the FLSA (less than 45% of the federal minimum wage). 

“While the legislature obviously felt strongly, this change will have little or zero impact on most state employers of size,” observes Debra Weiss Ford, Managing Partner of Jackson Lewis’ Portsmouth, New Hampshire office.  “State employers need to continue to monitor wage/hour compliance, which in many industries is not focused on the minimum wage.” 

Other states are unlikely to follow New Hampshire’s lead, as the trend in most state legislatures, including New York and Massachusetts, has been to expand worker protections. We will continue to advise regarding legislative developments in this area, including the recent Congressional hearings on the efficacy of the FLSA.

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The FLSA’s learned professional exemption provides an exemption from overtime for employees who have academic credentials in a field of “science or learning customarily acquired prolonged academic instruction” and who utilize this formal educational training in the performance of their job duties. Typical examples include doctors, lawyers, and certified public accountants, and doctors and lawyers need not even be paid on a salary basis. States with wage and hour laws generally have a similar exemption.

Historically, overtime disputes regarding the use of this exemption have centered in particular fields, such as engineering or, more recently, accounting. In a recent appellate decision from California, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District considered and rejected a challenge to the application of the California Labor Code’s learned professional exemption in the legal field. Zelasko-Barrett v. Brayton-Purcell, LLP, 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 1080 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Aug. 17, 2011).

In Zelasko, the Defendant firm utilized law students and law school graduates who had not yet passed the bar in the positions of Law Clerk I and Law Clerk II, respectively. Plaintiff held the Law Clerk II position prior to his admission to the bar for approximately 2 years, then moved on to the position of Associate Attorney. The Marin County Superior Court held that the plaintiff was properly classified as exempt when he held the position of Law Clerk II. 

Observing that the “federal regulations after which [the California learned professional exemption] was explicitly patterned . . . condition the learned professions exemption under federal law upon completion of an advanced course of education, not upon licensure,” the appellate Court ruled that possession of the degree, along with Defendant’s undisputed evidence that a Law Clerk II was required to perform all the same duties as a junior attorney, satisfied the exemption’s requirements.

Zelasko is an encouraging result for legal industry employers, which simultaneously highlights the broad scope of potential wage and hour liability. Industry employers must ensure that all employees classified as exempt are properly classified under federal and state law.  

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As noted in our recent article regarding proposed amendments to the FLSA, individuals providing care to the infirm or elderly in a private home are exempt from the minimum wage and overtime requirements pursuant to the companionship exemption, an exemption which was reviewed by the Supreme Court in its 2007 decision Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007). Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected a plaintiff’s allegation that the exemption did not apply because more than 20% of her time was devoted to “ordinary housework” as opposed to exempt care as a companion. Rodriguez v. Jones Boat Yard, Inc., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15509 (11th Cir. July 26, 2011).

The plaintiff in Rodriguez worked as a “live-in domestic” providing companionship and household services for an elderly woman in Coral Gables, Florida. The Aide worked from 7:00 am until 11:00 pm every day, assisting her client/employer getting out of bed, bathing, dying and combing her hair, and helping her ambulate. She also provided constant care “throughout the day” such as preparing all meals, assisting with dressing, buying necessary medicines, testing and administering her insulin, and assisting in meals. Plaintiff also performed other duties related to her employer’s medical care, including feeding and personal and residence hygiene. Analyzing plaintiff’s deposition testimony, the District Court concluded (and the Circuit Court affirmed) that the duties which were arguably of a general household nature (such as meal preparation, walking the dog, and cleaning the apartment) were incidental duties and did not come close to exceeding 20% of the total hours worked each week, which could jeopardize the applicability of the exemption. The Court also ruled that although the client’s son placed the Aide on his company’s payroll for the purposes of processing payments for these companionship services, this payroll arrangement did not make the son or the son’s corporation (Jones Boat Yard) plaintiff’s employer within the meaning of the FLSA.

The DOL is considering changes to the FLSA which would impact the applicability of the companionship exemption in cases such as Rodriguez. Previously, legislation has been proposed which would eliminate the exemption and reverse the impact of the Coke decision (though such legislation was not passed). Industry employers – and even individuals and their families employing in-home care such as that addressed in Rodriguez – should pay close attention to these developments. Many state laws also provide wage and hour protection to domestic workers.

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Earlier this month, the House of Representatives’ Sub-Committee on Workforce Protection convened a hearing entitled “The Fair Labor Standards Act: Is It Meeting the Needs of the Twenty-First Century Workplace?” A panel of speakers, representing Human Resources associations, management counsel and the employee advocacy group the National Employment Law Project, appeared before the Sub-Committee and responded to questions concerning, among other topics, the appropriateness of the current federal minimum wage of $7.25/hour, and whether the FLSA and its numerous arcane, difficult to understand provisions, create a barrier to compliance and economic growth. 

The three witnesses representing business interests all testified at length about the hardships associated with FLSA compliance, and the risks and costs of protracted and increasingly frequent litigation over FLSA issues. Judy Conti, a representative from the National Employment Law Project, an employee advocacy group, argued that absent the FLSA framework and private enforcement, employers would simply engage in a “race to the bottom” in an effort to further decrease labor costs. This viewpoint was also espoused by representative Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio). Statements from Representative Kucinich during the hearing regarding the inappropriateness of curtailing the FLSA can be viewed here. 

While this Congressional investigation into the need for FLSA reform should be heartening to employers throughout the United States, the present landscape continues to pose baffling problems for employers in terms of compliance and litigation avoidance, to say nothing of state law obligations.  

Interestingly, certain contemplated USDOL Wage and Hour Division actions may further increase employer obligations under the FLSA and exposure to FLSA lawsuits. In its semi-annual regulatory agenda, the Division indicated that in the fall it will propose a rule addressing the applicability of the companionship minimum wage and overtime exemption to companionship services provided in a domestic setting. The Division also indicated that it is continuing to work on a disclosure rule that could require employers to expain to employees the basis for their exempt and/or contractor classification.

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As discussed in prior postings, a central issue in determining the application of the FLSA’s “7(i)” exemption is whether the payments to the employee constitute bona fide commissions.  In early July, Judge Gregory Frost of the Southern District of Ohio issued another ruling on this issue, finding that the compensation paid to managers and assistant managers at certain Mr. Tire Auto Service Centers constituted bona fide commissions for purposes of the exemption.  McAninch v. Monro Muffler Brake, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71827 (S.D. Ohio July 5, 2011). 

McAninch involved a compensation scheme under which a manager or assistant manager received a percentage of the controllable profit for the store if the store met budgetary targets.  When the store deviated in performance from the precise budgetary figure set for the store, the manager’s compensation was recalculated pursuant to a detailed formula which considered monthly fluctuations in store performance, labor costs and controllable expenses.  In addition, the Company provided managers with a weekly guaranteed draw, designed to ensure continuity in their compensation, which was reconciled when calculating commissions earned.  The court rejected arguments that: (i) the draw negated the Company’s assertion that the commission plan was “bona fide”; (ii) tying the commission rate to store profits as opposed to store sales rendered the payments non-bona fide commissions; and (iii) the managers’ frequent failure to exceed the guaranteed draw affected the analysis.  Since the question of whether the payments based on the percentage of controllable profit consisted “bona fide commissions” was the sole prong of the 7(i) exemption (requiring also payment of time and one-half the minimum wage for all hours worked and employment at a “retail or service” establishment) raised by plaintiffs, summary judgment for defendants was appropriate. 

Use of commission and other forms of incentive compensation continues to be widespread among employers across all industries.  Employers contemplating implementation of a 7(i) compliant commission plan should consult with counsel and closely scrutinize applicable federal and state law.

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As discussed in detail on Jackson Lewis’ California Workplace Blog, the Ninth Circuit has resuscitated the California Labor Code’s “learned professional” exemption, reversing a decision from the Eastern District of California which held that unlicensed accountants could not qualify as a matter of law.  Campbell v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12062 (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 2011).

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We previously discussed New York courts applying the FLSA’s executive exemption, which exempts employees whose primary duty is management (and who are paid on a salary basis) from minimum wage and overtime pay obligations. Recently, Judge Berman of the Southern District upheld the application of the exemption to a group of warehouse “Captains.” Ramos v. Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66631 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2011)(Berman, J).

Ramos concerned warehouse captains who oversee a team of 3-6 “pickers,” the employees responsible for compiling orders of merchandise within defendant’s warehouse and loading that merchandise onto trucks for delivery to defendant’s customers. Relying heavily on the testimony of plaintiff Jose Barranco, whom the parties stipulated would serve as the representative deponent for all eight Captain plaintiffs, the court observed that this testimonial evidence (along with other affidavits submitted by defendant from other Captains) established that each Captain was “in charge” of his pickers because captains:

·         Ensured that pickers arrive to work on time;

·         Ensured that pickers performed their job duties correctly and at an acceptable productivity level;

·         Counseled pickers who worked too slowly or made too many mistakes;

·         Gave particular assignments to specific pickers based on his or her belief that that individual picker could carry out the assigned task (i.e., obtain the correct product for the order);

·         Participated in the performance evaluations for those on their team and served as the primary source of information for the night warehouse manager (the Captains’ own supervisor) concerning pickers’ performance;

·         Could request transfer of pickers away from his or her team;

·         Had the authority to issue a warning to a picker; and,

·         Completed a picker production report for every picker on his team each night, and conducted a final sign-out and inspection of the pickers equipment. 

Calling these tasks “clearly managerial,” the court ruled, in line with DOL regulations, that these managerial tasks constituted the pickers primary duty and that each captain’s team constituted a recognized “department or subdivision” over which that captain had managerial control. Finally, the court found that while the credible evidence established that a Captain could hire or fire pickers, such finding was not determinative as “courts uniformly reject arguments that an employee cannot be an exempt executive if he cannot make hiring or firing decisions.” Id. citing Pollard v. GPM Invs., LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24199 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2011) (collecting cases).

This decision highlights the fact- intensive inquiry necessary to determine if an individual is an exempt executive, especially if the individual is a “front line” supervisor responsible for hands-on review of the work performed by non-exempt employees. Employers must continually analyze the appropriateness of their classification of managers as exempt executives under both federal and state law. 

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The FLSA limits when an individual can provide services to an organization without compensation. See post dated April 6, 2010 “We Don’t Have to Pay Our Interns – Do We?”  However, last month a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (including Retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor sitting by designation) re-confirmed one such circumstance, holding that a full-time public school employee who also voluntarily coached a golf program for a small stipend was a volunteer under the FLSA and not entitled to minimum wage or overtime pay. Purdham v. Fairfax County School Board, No. 10-1048, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 4644 (4th Cir Mar. 10, 2011). Although the plaintiff alleged he worked 400-450 hours per year as a coach, because his regular, overtime-eligible position as a security assistant was not conditioned on his coaching position, he was considered a volunteer under the FLSA when performing services as golf coach.

The plaintiff proffered five arguments in support of his claim he was an employee entitled to minimum wage and overtime for coaching activities:

(1)   He subjectively considered himself an employee and not a volunteer;

(2)   The terms of his employment contract established that he was an employee and not a volunteer;

(3)   Defendant made a prior retroactive payment for overtime wages to all non-exempt employees who performed coaching duties;

(4)   Defendant provided paid administrative leave when coaching responsibilities conflicted with regular full-time work; and

(5)   Defendant paid a small stipend to coaches.

The court dismissed out-of-hand the plaintiff’s first two arguments, finding that plaintiff’s subjective views and the terms of his employment contract are not controlling. The court also found that the prior retroactive payment for overtime wages made to all non-exempt employees who performed coaching duties merely exhibited an “abundance of caution” on the part of the school district, especially in light of the extensive FLSA-related litigation occurring in other school districts at the time.  Similarly, paid administrative leave provided by the school district in order to allow coaches to perform their voluntary coaching responsibilities was found not to be prohibited under the FLSA, as such a rule would be inconsistent with the FLSA’s statutory goals.  Lastly, the court determined that the small stipend the plaintiff received was plainly permitted under controlling FLSA regulations, and as a result did not serve to defeat the volunteer work exemption in this instance. 

While volunteer public school coaches like the Plaintiff in Purdham may be considered volunteers in their coaching capacity, public employers must ensure that all requirements for a volunteer are satisfied (and that non-volunteer work is not performed during volunteer hours).  While a similar volunteer exemption applies in the private sector for non-profit organizations, the volunteer concept is not recognized in the for profit private sector. See 29 CFR § 553.101(a); DOL Op Ltr FLSA2008-3NA.

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It is well understood that employees misclassified as exempt under the FLSA are entitled to overtime pay for hours worked in excess of forty in a week. However, while the United States Department of Labor takes the position that any unpaid overtime is calculated using the “half-time” method, not all of the Circuit Courts have confirmed the appropriateness of such calculation. Last week, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (which covers Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North and South Carolina), joining the First, Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuit courts, held that such calculation is appropriate. Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 702 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2011).

Desmond involved three former employees who worked as racing officials at Defendants’ race track who alleged that Defendants had misclassified them as exempt “administrative” employees. The court agreed with Plaintiffs, and held that they were owed “half time” overtime. Under this method, for each week within the limitations period, an employee’s weekly salary is divided by the number of hours they worked to determine their “regular rate,” and the employee receives 50% of that rate for each hour in excess of 40. Plaintiffs appealed, urging that an employer who is found to have misclassified an employee must calculate overtime by dividing the weekly salary by 40, then paying time-and-one-half (150%) of that rate for each overtime hour.

The Court first reviewed the appellate authority from other Circuits authorizing and approving the half time calculation, including the Seventh Circuit’s 2010 decision in Urnikis-Negro v. Am. Family Prop. Servs., 616 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2010), discussed here. In reaching its decision, the court also noted “In addition to these decisions from our sister circuits, the Department of Labor also has approved using a 50% overtime premium to calculate unpaid overtime compensation in a mistaken exemption classification case.” Id. at * 11 citing Retroactive Payment of Overtime and the Fluctuating Workweek Method of Payment, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter, FLSA 2009-3 (Dep't of Labor Jan. 14, 2009).

While this decision is positive for employers, the appropriate calculation remains unaddressed in seven federal circuits, including the Second, Ninth and D.C. Circuits. Additionally, the plaintiff in Urnikis-Negro has petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review the Seventh Circuit’s decision, Supreme Court Docket No. 10-745. Employers should continue to monitor the state of the law in this area, given its impact on misclassification exposure. Further, employers should ensure that employees classified as exempt are not told anything other than that their salary covers all hours worked.

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The Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay non-exempt employees one and one half times their regular rate of pay for any hours worked in a workweek in excess of 40. United States Department of Labor regulations, as set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 778.114(a), allow an employer to utilize the fluctuating workweek (“FWW”) method of overtime payment. Pursuant to FWW, in determining overtime due, an employer divides the weekly wage by the total number of hours worked during the week and then pays additional half-time for overtime hours. The more overtime hours worked, the lower the regular rate of pay and the overtime due for each overtime hour. 

One would think that if a salaried employee is found to have been misclassified as non-exempt, this same formula should be applied in determining any overtime due. However, while the federal appellate courts have applies such formula, some district courts have taken the position that any overtime must be calculated by dividing the salary by 40 to determine the regular rate and paying 1.5 times the regular rate for all overtime hours. The difference in calculations can be significant as demonstrated by the following examples.

SALARY: $1,000

HOURS WORKED: 50

Half-time calculation (FWW): $1000/50 hours = $20/hour regular rate of pay/2 = $10 times 10 overtime hours -=$100 due

Time-and-a-half calculation: $1000/40 hours = $25/hour regular rate of pay X 1.5 = $37.50 times 10 overtime hours = $375 due

The difference between the amounts of overtime due under these two calculation methods is always at least three-fold. As the number of hours in the workweek increases, the spread between the two methods grows.

Earlier this week, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit endorsed the first FWW-type calculation. See Urnikis-Negro v. Am. Family Prop. Servs., — F.3d. —, No. 08-3117, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16126 (7th Cir. 2010).  In finding this method of overtime calculation appropriate, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the parties “had a ‘clear and mutual understanding’ that [the employee’s] weekly salary of $1,000 was meant to compensate her for however many hours she worked, not 40 or some other number.”  Id. at *18.  Notably, in reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit referred to an article published by Jackson Lewis partner Paul DeCamp (head of the Firm’s Wage and Hour Practice Group and former Wage and Hour Administrator for the United States Department of Labor) and associate Jacqueline C. Tully, Half-Time or Time and a Half? Calculating Overtime in Misclassification Cases, 278 Fair Lab. Stds. Handbook for States, Local Gov’t & Sch. Newsl. 3 (Nov. 2008). The Court specifically relied on this article for the proposition that the “proper focus in calculating [the] regular rate of pay for [a] misclassified employee is on whether [the] parties intended [a] fixed salary to compensate [an] employee for all hours worked in [a] work-week or solely for [the] first 40 hours.”  Id. at *45. 

The employee argued that “use of the more employer-friendly FWW method gives employers an incentive to misclassify employees as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements or otherwise withhold overtime pay, as they will be little the worse off if and when sued to enforce the statute’s requirements.”  Id. at *55.  In response, the Seventh Circuit stated that the district court awarded liquidated damages, attorney’s fees and costs to the employee, thereby causing the employer to endure penalties for miscategorizing her as an exempt employee.

As with many other wage and hour issues, courts have not been fully consistent even when determining the regular rate is based on salary divided by total hours worked. Some courts have taken the position that time and a half the regular rate is due for all hours over 40 and not just additional half time. Further confusing the issue, some of these courts divide the salary by 40 hours to determine the regular rate, while others still use the total hours worked. These calculations are not supported by regulation but generally based on the court’s view of the equities. 

While this issue may ultimately need to be resolved by the Supreme Court, this is a helpful decision for employers, especially those within the Seventh Circuit. It also reminds employers to reiterate to all salaried employees that their salary covers all hours worked. The Court’s reference to the article published by Jackson Lewis attorneys also demonstrates that the Firm is at the forefront of legal analysis and theory in the wage and hour arena, the forum that continues to pose the highest level of risk related to workplace compliance.

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As discussed here, an employer’s maintenance of accurate records of hours worked by employees is not only a substantive requirement of the FLSA, but an essential component to defending against “off the clock” claims. But what happens if an employee brings such a claim and the employer has not maintained records? Is the employer defenseless?

The answer is “Not necessarily,” as highlighted in the recent decision issued by a federal judge following an trial in the District of Maryland. Almendarez v. J.T.T., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57371 (D. Md. June 8, 2010). In Almendarez, a jury found that all seven plaintiffs worked overtime, and that Defendants did not maintain appropriate records. However, the jury found that only three of the plaintiffs worked overtime for which they were not properly compensated. The  jury found that the employer properly compensated the four remaining plaintiffs for overtime hours worked. These four plaintiffs moved for an order that they were entitled to an overtime award as a matter of law based on the jury’s factual findings, or in the alternative for a new trial.

In denying the plaintiffs’ request, the Judge first explained that in the absence of the records required by the FLSA, evidence regarding hours actually worked and overtime paid were governed by the framework set forth in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946). To recover on an unpaid overtime claim under Mt. Clemens, a Plaintiff is “required to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he actually worked overtime hours for which he was not compensated at the required rate.” Almendarez, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 57371 at * 11. Because making this determination in the absence of proper records is “heavily dependent on the jury's assessment of the credibility and veracity of the witnesses”, and since the jury considered the admissible evidence as to overtime hours worked and overtime compensation paid, the court held that the jury’s verdicts were not subject to reversal as a matter of law. The jury was entitled to credit the Defendant’s evidence in the form of “testimony regarding the number of hours required to complete Plaintiffs' work day and how much they were paid”, along with some “documentary evidence regarding the amounts Plaintiffs were paid in specific periods.” Id. at * 11-12. 

While the failure to maintain proper records both constitutes a likely FLSA violation and can hinder the defense of FLSA overtime actions, Defendants faced with FLSA claims for alleged unpaid working time should consider all the evidentiary means available to rebut allegations of alleged unpaid work.

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In general, when calculating the regular rate of pay for purposes of determining overtime under the FLSA, all remuneration must be included.  This rule is subject to certain limited exceptions for, inter alia, discretionary bonuses and reimbursement of legitimate expenses.  But, if an employer decides to provide an hourly “per diem” and classify it as expense reimbursement, can the employer exclude the “per diem” from the regular rate of pay?  In a decision issued last week, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the District Court’s finding of a willful violation of the FLSA, held that an employer violated the Act by excluding such “per diem” from the regular rate of pay in an attempt to artificially lower the regular rate of pay.  Gagnon v. United Technisource Inc., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 10880 (5th Cir. May 27, 2010).

The facts before the court were simple.  The employer initially paid the plaintiff a straight time rate of $5.50 per hour, plus a per diem of $12.50 per hour for the first 40 hours worked each workweek, and an overtime rate of $20 per hour thereafter.    Later on, the employer increased the plaintiff’s hourly per diem and hourly overtime rate by $1 (i.e., to $13.50 and $21.00 respectively) while leaving the straight time rate unchanged, characterizing this increase as a “raise.”  When Plaintiff sued for alleged unpaid overtime, the employer asserted that its overtime payments exceeded legal obligations as the overtime rate was much greater than time and a half the hourly rate of $5.50 per hour.  The employer further asserted that the per diem reasonably approximated reimbursable expenses and thus did not need to be included in the regular rate of pay.     

The Court rejected the employer’s defenses.  While recognizing that a per diem could be excludable from the regular rate, the Court deferred to the Department of Labor’s position, as delineated in the Field Operations Handbook, that any per diem or similar payment that is based upon hours worked must be included in the regular rate. Id. at fn. 6.  The Court expressed its belief that the employer had attempted to artificially reduce the regular rate and reduce overtime costs and stated “we can conceive of no reason why a legitimate per diem would vary by the hour and be capped at the forty-hour mark, which not so coincidentally corresponds to the point at which regular wages stop and the overtime rate applies.”  Id. at * 9. The Court also: (i) rejected the employer’s attempt to offset liability with allegedly overpaid per diem that the plaintiff should not have received based on a change in his home address which moved him closer to the workplace and theoretically reduced his expenses (on the basis that the per diem was actually part of the regular rate of pay and not expense reimbursement in the first place); (ii) reiterated that a counterclaim is inappropriate in an FLSA action pursuant to precedent (and must be brought separately, if at all); and (iii) stated that plaintiff’s attorneys were entitled to recover fees for their work on the appeal while vacating the initial fee award due to the District Court’s failure to explain the basis therefore (which, as an aside, was 6 times back pay and liquidated damages awarded to the Plaintiff, combined).

All employers should review their overtime calculation protocols to ensure they are paying time and a half the properly calculated regular rate of pay for all overtime hours.  To the extent an employer provides a per diem for expense reimbursement, if the per diem is based on hours worked, there is a significant concern with excluding the “per diem” from the regular rate calculation.

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Under the FLSA (and most state laws), the fluctuating workweek method (FWW) of overtime payment allows employers to reduce overtime expense by paying “half time” for all overtime hours if the following four factors are satisfied: 1) employees’ hours fluctuate from week; (2) employees receive a fixed salary each week that does not vary with the number of non-overtime hours worked during each workweek; 3) the fixed salary provides compensation every week at a regular rate that is at least equal to the minimum wage, and 4) the employer and employees’ share a “clear mutual understanding” that Defendants will pay that fixed salary regardless of the number of hours worked.

However, as demonstrated by last week’s decision by United States District Court Judge Jose L. Linares of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, an employer who sets out to utilize the FWW approach pays a strict penalty for non-compliance. See Brumley v. Camin Cargo Control, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126785 (D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2009). 

In his decision, Judge Linares denied summary judgment to defendants in this collective action based on the employer having made one impermissible deduction to one employee.   The Court rejected the employer’s argument that an isolated event of this type was statistically insignificant, stating that such an assertion goes to “weight.” More importantly, the Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs based on the employer making additional payments to employees, such as offshore pay, holiday pay and day-off pay, finding that due to such payments, the employer did not pay the fixed salary required to utilize the FWW overtime calculation method.

The negative implications of this decision did not end here.   In evaluating potential damages, the Court rejected the employer’s argument that damages should be calculated based on the half-time method that is part and parcel of the FWW calculation of overtime and held that “the default FLSA damage calculation, ‘time-and-a-half for all hours over 40,’” should apply to Plaintiffs who were not paid properly. The Court also denied summary judgment to both parties as to whether FLSA liquidated damages and a 3-year statute of limitations should be imposed, finding that trial testimony is necessary to determine whether the employer acted in good faith and took reasonable steps to comply with the FWW calculation methodology. Finally, citing to the FLSA regulations and precedent within the Third Circuit, the Court rejected the employer’s argument that overpayments from different pay periods be applied to offset liability.

Employees who avail themselves of the fluctuating workweek method of overtime should ensure they are properly implementing its requirements.

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