Jackson Lewis Team Defeats Conditional Certification In Store Manager Litigation

Recently, we discussed the standard applicable to collective action certification of FLSA claims at the so-called “second stage”, which occurs after factual discovery. This is a more stringent standard than that applied to cases at the initial “conditional certification” stage, where courts apply a standard that varies from circuit to circuit, but is typically lenient. However, in a case defended by Jackson Lewis attorneys led by former USDOL Wage and Hour Administrator and current Jackson Lewis Wage and Hour Practice Group Leader Paul DeCamp, Federal Judge J. Phil Gilbert of the Southern District of Illinois recently rejected a plaintiff’s request for conditional certification of a group of store managers. Drew v. Shoe Show, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106503 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2011).

Drew concerned the putative collective action claim of a plaintiff who worked as a store manager for one of defendant’s retail shoe stores in Illinois. She alleged that her primary duties were non-managerial and equivalent to those performed by hourly, non-exempt employees. Specifically, she alleged that she: 1) was not responsible for hiring or firing employees at the store; 2) was not given access to financials and other information relevant to store management; and 3) was subject to intense scrutiny and micromanagement from a district manager, who presided over several stores. In analyzing whether plaintiff’s evidence (which was not supplemented by affidavits of support from other store managers, or other current and former employees) satisfied plaintiff’s obligation to make the “modest factual showing” of a common policy required within the Seventh Circuit and many other courts necessary for conditional certification, the Court noted that in support of her motion, along with her own affidavit, plaintiff pointed only to corporate policies and a job description she believed were applied uniformly across defendant’s store managers.  However, she admitted that her beliefs about store manager duties, other than at her own store, were “based on her limited experience at two or three other [of defendant’s] stores and on several conversations she had with other store managers, but which she cannot recollect with any degree of specificity.” This allegation was further undercut by Defendant’s practice of classifying some store managers as exempt, and others as non-exempt, based on an individual analysis of their duties.

The court concluded that plaintiff had provided “no evidence that, beyond responsibility for those core functions [of store management], all store managers perform similar activities for the same percentage of work time such as they are similarly situated with respect to the question of whether they are properly categorized as exempt under the FLSA.” Absent this showing, the court found that plaintiff failed to meet her burden, and denied conditional certification. 

While defendants in putative misclassification collective actions continue to urge that courts should take the case-by-case, fact-intensive exemption analysis into consideration, many courts continue to permit conditional certification (and notice to putative collective action members) based solely on the affidavit of a named plaintiff alleging a uniformly-applicable job description applied to the duties of all employees holding the position. Employers should consider ease of certification in determining whether to apply a uniform classification to store managers (or any other job title), or to engage in a case-by-case duties analysis before reaching classification decisions. In the same vein, employers should consider the pros and cons of national policies and procedures and job descriptions.

New York Federal Court Finds Gas Station and Convenience Store Manager To Be An Exempt Executive

The subject of many FLSA actions is store managers and whether they are properly classified as exempt employees. In a recent victory for the employer community, Judge Glenn Suddaby of the Northern District of New York held as a matter of law that Express Mart properly classified its store manager in Cato, New York as exempt. Guinup v. Petr-All Petroleum Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86280 (N.D.N.Y Aug. 23, 2010).

Plaintiff Guinup was the store manager for Store 360, a combination convenience store and gas station. In her claim for overtime, she did not dispute that three of the four requirements for the executive exemption were met: namely, that she; 1) was paid on a salary basis and earned at least $455 per week; 2) customarily and regularly directed the work of two or more employees; and 3) had the authority to hire or fire employee or in the alternative make recommendations as to hiring and firing which received particular weight. Id. at * 17-18. Rather, Plaintiff argued that as a store manager she did not meet the requirement that her “primary duty [be] management of the enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof.” Id. citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.100. 

The Court then reviewed the four factors utilized to determine whether an employee’s primary duty is management: “[1] the relative importance of the exempt duties as compared with other types of duties; [2] the amount of time spent performing exempt work; [3] the employee's relative freedom from direct supervision; and [4] the relationship between the employee's salary and the wages paid to other employees for the kind of nonexempt work performed by the employee.” Id. In holding that each factor militated in favor of exempt status  the Court observed that Plaintiff’s duties included:

interviewing and hiring new employees, scheduling, training, writing performance evaluations, reporting employee and customer injuries to corporate, discussing sales performance and promotions with corporate, conducting surveys of competitors' gas prices and convenience store business, and controlling "shrink." Plaintiff was also responsible for making recommendations to corporate regarding product ordering and pricing, new hire pay rates, employee discipline and termination, and certain Store 360 security measures. Furthermore, Plaintiff accepted phone calls at home from her subordinates at Store 360 regarding incidents that arose at Store 360 when she was not working.

Id. at * 21. 

Based on these duties, the Court observed that “Store 360 could not have operated successfully unless Plaintiff performed her managerial functions.” As the most senior on-site employee, the Court found she was relatively free from supervision on a day-to-day basis even if she had an “active” Area Supervisor because, inter alia, the Area Supervisor was responsible for ten stores. Finally, based on the Court’s estimate of the compensation of Plaintiff’s assistant manager, Plaintiff was paid approximately 31.7% more than that employee, her highest-ranking subordinate.

While the Guinup decision is favorable to employers, the applicability of the executive exemption continues to be a fact-sensitive, highly technical analysis with divergent court opinions. Whenever a managerial employee is not the highest ranking on-site employee (as Guinup was), particular care must be taken in assessing applicability of the exemption.  And even if the employee is the highest rank on-site there must be significant exercise of managerial duties. All retail employers must focus on this issue.

Store Managers Are Always Exempt - Aren't They?

In a case involving retailer Dollar General, another federal judge has refused to hold as a matter of law that a retail store manager is an overtime-exempt “executive” for purposes of the FLSA.  Judge James Jones denied summary judgment to Dollar General in Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62584 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010) based upon his “fact-intensive inquiry as to each prong of the five-factor [exemption] test.”  Id. at * 8. 

Plaintiff Hale had served as a full-time clerk and then an assistant store manager before her promotion to store manager.  Even though the parties agreed that as store manager Hale satisfied the salary basis test for exemption, and that “her work included the regular direction of two or more employees,” Plaintiff testified that she spent only ten percent of her time – six hours per week – on managerial tasks and the remainder of her time “performing menial labor: cleaning restrooms, scrubbing floors, checking out customers, and stocking shelves.” Id. at * 9. She further claimed that Dollar General’s policy of limiting her quota of labor hours for non-exempt employees forced her to run the store by herself or with a skeleton crew a large percentage of the time.

Consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s similar decision in Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2008), the Court determined that “[b]ased upon the applicable five-prong test, a reasonable juror could determine that Hale's primary duty was not management.”  This test examines: (1) "the amount of time spent in performance of  [*6] managerial duties"; (2) "the relative importance of the managerial duties as compared with other types of duties," (3) "the frequency with which the employee exercises discretionary powers"; (4) "his relative freedom from supervision"; and (5) the relationship between the employee's "salary and the wages paid other employees for the kind of nonexempt work performed by the supervisor." Id at * 5-6 citing Morgan.  On this last issue, the Court observed that based on Plaintiff’s testimony that she worked 60-70 hours per week, a factual question existed as to whether the “effective rate” at which she was paid was actually less than that paid to the non-exempt employees who reported to her.

This highly technical attack on the use of the executive exemption in retail stores has divided courts, but highlights both the technical nature of the exemption and the need to ensure that for purposes of the FLSA an exempt “executive’s” primary duty is management and that such primary duty is reflected by documents such as evaluations and disciplinary notices.

[UPDATE]  On July 8, 2010 a second district judge echoed the reasoning in Hale, denying Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment in another misclassification case brought by a store manager in Missouri.  Kanatzer v. Dolgencorp, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67798 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010).  In Kanatzer, the judge found material issues of fact as to all four factors set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a).