Wage and Hour Law Update : Wage & Hour Lawyer & Attorney : Jackson Lewis Law Firm : Minimum Wage, Overtime & Service Contracts

Reflecting the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision regarding the scope of protected activity under the FLSA, the U.S. Department of Labor has issued Fact Sheet 77A, summarizing the Department’s view of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.    Simultaneously, the Department also issued fact sheets addressing retaliation under the FMLA and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act.

Fact Sheet 77A sets forth the DOL’s assessment of the current legal landscape, including the Kasten decision, holding that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision (29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)) protects complaining employees “regardless of whether the complaint is made orally or in writing.” The fact sheet goes further, addressing the question the Supreme Court declined to answer in Kasten: namely, whether such written or oral complaints can be protected if made internally, or whether to be protected such complaint must be made formally to the Department of Labor or through a formal filing of a claim (i.e., a lawsuit). In the DOL’s view “most courts have ruled that internal complaints to an employer are also protected.” While this view has been endorsed in multiple forums, notably, courts within the Second Circuit have continued to adhere to the Second Circuit’s 1993 decision in Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993), holding that a formal complaint is required. Son v. Reina Bijoux, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116417 at * 12-14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011) citing Lambert. 

The DOL’s fact sheet clarifies the Department’s position, but is not “news” to employers who monitor this space or otherwise educate themselves on these issues. Such employers also know that many state laws, including New York’s retaliation provision as modified by the 2011 Wage Theft Prevention Act, provide for greater protections than those contemplated under federal law and discussed in Fact Sheet 77A.

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The Supreme Court's web site confirms that the nation's highest court has granted the petition for certiorari filed by the pharmaceutical sales representative (PSR) plaintiffs in Christopher et al. v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation.  The Court will now review the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Christopher that SmithKline properly classifies its pharmaceutical sales representatives as "outside sales" employees, despite the FDA regulations precluding PSRs from receiving money from the medical practitioners they visit.  Absent unforeseen delays, the parties (and the industry at large) should expect a ruling prior to end of the Court’s 2011/2012 term. 

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As the pharmaceutical community eagerly awaits the Supreme Court’s decision whether to grant certiorari in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., courts within the Third Circuit (encompassing Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware) continue to conform to the appeals court’s previous holding in Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2010), that pharmaceutical representatives meet the test for the administrative exemption under federal and Pennsylvania law. See Ibanez v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131945 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2011).

In Ibanez, as in previous cases such as Smith and Baum v. AstraZeneca LP, 372 Fed. Appx. 246 (3d Cir. 2010), the court determined that “plaintiff regularly exercised discretion and independent judgment in all aspects of his job, including pre-call planning, interactions with physicians, territory business planning, and the planning of events.” rejected plaintiff’s reliance on U.S. Department of Labor guidance concerning the applicability of the administrative exemption to positions and duties allegedly analogous to the PSR position. Some courts, relying on this guidance, have narrowly interpreted the exemption to apply principally (if not solely) to operational employees such as Human Resources, Accounting or Information Technology. ]

The continuing “wave” of wage-and-hour litigation seeking to find PSR’s non-exempt presents an important case study for employers in other industries, where assumptions about the exempt status of particular classifications of employees persist. A preventive audit is often the only way to detect potential wage-and-hour exposures (individual and/or class-wide) and make changes before they are identified via costly litigation.  As to PSR’s, the issue only will be resolved if the Supreme Court grants certiorari and provides guidance to the industry as to the applicability of both the administrative and outside sales exemptions.

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As often discussed in this space and elsewhere, Courts continue to widely differ in their analysis as to whether the administrative and/or outside sales exemptions are applicable to pharmaceutical sales representatives. Now, the Supreme Court will have another opportunity to weigh in on the applicability of the outside sales exemption to such employees, as the plaintiffs in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011) have petitioned the Court to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision finding them to be properly classified as outside salespersons. Christopher, et al. v. SmithKline, Supreme Court Docket No. 11-204.

While acceptance of the petition and a ruling from the high court would hopefully provide welcome clarity in this area, even a resolution by the Supreme Court of the circuit split between Christopher and the Second Circuit’s decision in In Re Novartis will not resolve all outstanding issues relating to the classification of these employees, as Courts continue to differ on the applicability of the administrative exemption.

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While the US Supreme Court recently has rejected petitions for certiorari on key FLSA exemption issues, the highest court in the United States did this term elect to take up the scope of the statute’s protection of workers who make complaints of FLSA violations to their employer.  As discussed in greater detail here, the Court has ruled that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), applies to oral complaints, as well as written ones.  The Court did not decide the related issue of whether such a complaint is protected when made internally, to the employer, or only where it is made to a public agency (such as the Department of Labor).  This ruling does not provide the clarification most had hoped for, but makes clear that a cautious employer will treat all such complaints by an employee as protected activity under the statute.

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Despite the Circuit split created by this month’s decision from the Ninth Circuit, holding that pharmaceutical sales representatives are outside sales employees within the meaning of the FLSA, the Supreme Court has declined to take up Novartis’ appeal of the adverse ruling it received on this issue from the Second Circuit.  The Supreme Court’s ruling was contained in its Order List for February 28, and does not provide any insight into the Court’s thinking. 

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As previously discussed here and here, several Circuit courts have recently upheld use of the “half time” calculation of damages in FLSA misclassification cases. Urnikis-Negro v. Am. Family Prop. Servs., — F.3d. —, No. 08-3117, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16126 (7th Cir. 2010); Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 702 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2011). In its Order List for February 22, 2011, the Supreme Court denied the employee’s petition for review of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Urnikis-Negro. While this denial means the high court will not provide definitive guidance on this issue, the Circuit courts which have addressed the issue and the Department of Labor all have held the half time method of calculation to be appropriate if the salary paid was intended to cover all hours worked.

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On February 14, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held GlaxoSmithKline's pharmaceutical sales representatives (“PSRs”) are exempt from the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime requirements under the outside sales exemption, rejecting a contrary decision from the Second Circuit, and an amicus brief filed by the United States Department of Labor.  Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2834 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2011).  The Ninth Circuit refused to defer to the DOL, finding the amicus brief was merely a new “reinterpretation” of the exemption by the DOL, set forth only in its amicus brief, not in any regulations, and constituted a break from pharmaceutical industry standards regarding what constitutes sales, which the DOL had not objected to since the FLSA’s inception decades ago.   According to the Ninth Circuit, “[i]n this industry, [a] ‘sale’ is the exchange of non-binding commitments between the PSR and physician at the end of a successful call. . . . [F]or all practical purposes, this is a sale.”  Id. at * 35 (emphasis added). 

Based on this Circuit split and the existing split between the Second and Third Circuits over the application of the administrative exemption to PSRs (not at issue in the Ninth Circuit decision), the Supreme Court may be more likely to weigh in on this issue.

We will continue to monitor developments surrounding this evolving issue.

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It is well understood that employees misclassified as exempt under the FLSA are entitled to overtime pay for hours worked in excess of forty in a week. However, while the United States Department of Labor takes the position that any unpaid overtime is calculated using the “half-time” method, not all of the Circuit Courts have confirmed the appropriateness of such calculation. Last week, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (which covers Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North and South Carolina), joining the First, Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuit courts, held that such calculation is appropriate. Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 702 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2011).

Desmond involved three former employees who worked as racing officials at Defendants’ race track who alleged that Defendants had misclassified them as exempt “administrative” employees. The court agreed with Plaintiffs, and held that they were owed “half time” overtime. Under this method, for each week within the limitations period, an employee’s weekly salary is divided by the number of hours they worked to determine their “regular rate,” and the employee receives 50% of that rate for each hour in excess of 40. Plaintiffs appealed, urging that an employer who is found to have misclassified an employee must calculate overtime by dividing the weekly salary by 40, then paying time-and-one-half (150%) of that rate for each overtime hour.

The Court first reviewed the appellate authority from other Circuits authorizing and approving the half time calculation, including the Seventh Circuit’s 2010 decision in Urnikis-Negro v. Am. Family Prop. Servs., 616 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2010), discussed here. In reaching its decision, the court also noted “In addition to these decisions from our sister circuits, the Department of Labor also has approved using a 50% overtime premium to calculate unpaid overtime compensation in a mistaken exemption classification case.” Id. at * 11 citing Retroactive Payment of Overtime and the Fluctuating Workweek Method of Payment, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter, FLSA 2009-3 (Dep't of Labor Jan. 14, 2009).

While this decision is positive for employers, the appropriate calculation remains unaddressed in seven federal circuits, including the Second, Ninth and D.C. Circuits. Additionally, the plaintiff in Urnikis-Negro has petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review the Seventh Circuit’s decision, Supreme Court Docket No. 10-745. Employers should continue to monitor the state of the law in this area, given its impact on misclassification exposure. Further, employers should ensure that employees classified as exempt are not told anything other than that their salary covers all hours worked.

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In the latest installment of the ongoing litigation over whether pharmaceutical sales representatives are exempt from overtime under the FLSA (see earlier post here), a district court in Indiana declined to reconsider its decision holding that PSRs do qualify for the outside sales exemption. See Schaefer-Larose v. Eli Lilly & Co., S..D. Ind. Docket No. 07-CV-1133, Order dated Sept. 29, 2010. 

The Court observed that “a substantial amount of activity has occurred in courts throughout the country with regard to the question of whether pharmaceutical sales representatives are exempt under the FLSA [since the court issued its decision holding that outside sales exemption applies].” Order at 2; Schaefer-Larose v. Eli Lilly & Co., 663 F. Supp. 2d 674 (S.D. Ind. 2009). While acknowledging that some of these rulings “do not correspond with our analysis” – including the Second Circuit’s recent Novartis decision – absent guidance from the relevant appeals court (the Seventh Circuit), the Court stated that its decision on the issue “cannot be a swinging pendulum, vacillating back and forth as each new ruling addressing this question is handed down by some court or another across the nation.” Id. at 3. 

The resolution of whether PSRs qualify for the outside sales or administrative exemption likely will ultimately need to be resolved by the United States Supreme Court.

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In a much-awaited decision, earlier this week  the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a New York District Court and held that pharmaceutical sales representatives are not exempt outside sales or administrative employees.  In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., No. 09-0437-cv, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13708 (2d Cir. July 6, 2010). The Court concurred with and deferred to the position of the U.S. Secretary of Labor, who appeared as amicus curiae or “friend of the court” at the appellate stage, and stated that  “the Secretary of Labor’s interpretations of her regulations are entitled to “‘controlling’ deference unless those interpretations are ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”   In essence, the Second Circuit held that the representatives do not meet the outside sales exemption because “where [an] employee promotes a pharmaceutical product to a physician but can transfer to the physician nothing more than free samples and cannot lawfully transfer ownership of any quantity of the drug in exchange for anything of value, cannot lawfully take an order for its purchase, and cannot lawfully even obtain from the physician a binding commitment to prescribe it[,] . . . it is not plainly erroneous to conclude that the employee has not in any sense, within the meaning of the statute or the regulations, made a sale.” In a similarly narrow interpretation of the FLSA, the Second Circuit, again deferring to the Secretary’s view, held that the representatives’ duties do not demonstrate the necessary exercise of independent discretion and judgment as to matters of significance for application of the administrative exemption, and performance of those duties required only skills gained through training

A petition for review likely will follow and the scope of the exemptions may need to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, in light of conflicting authority including the Third Circuit’s contrary decision applying the administrative exemption to pharmaceutical sales representatives.  See Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2010)

For a more detailed analysis of the Second Circuit’s decision, click here. 

[UPDATE].  On July 19, 2010, another district court within the Third Circuit relied on the Johnson & Johnson decision to hold that pharmaceutical sales representatives qualify for the administrative exemption.  Jackson v. Alpharma, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72435 (D.N.J. July 19, 2010).  The ever-growing and sharply divided body of authority regarding applicability of the administrative exemption in the pharmaceutical industry make In Re Novartis a candidate for Supreme Court review.  We will continue to monitor developments in the case. 

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The FLSA’s administrative exemption requires the party claiming exemption to establish that the employee was engaged in “administrative” work, as opposed to “production” work (the so-called administrative/production dichotomy). Determining whether an employee meets the administrative exemption can be challenging.   This determination is even more difficult in white-collar industries, where unlike in manufacturing, it is not so easy to differentiate between production and administrative work.

In 2009, the Second Circuit reversed a District Court and held an underwriter for Chase J.P. Morgan did not meet the administrative exemption since the employee “produced” the bank’s product, and did not service the business (like an accountant, Information Technology professional or human resources professional).   The Supreme Court yesterday declined to review the SecondCircuit’s decision.   Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 2009) cert denied 559 U.S. ___ (Supreme Court Case No. 09-1160, May 3, 2010). Therefore, in the Second Circuit white-collar employers need to evaluate the position in light of this decision before classifying employees as exempt administrators. This concern is underscored by the fact that the Second Circuit’s decision supports an argument that the exercise of independent discretion and judgment is not relevant to this analysis – if the employee is deemed to perform production work, a Court need not reach the question of the existence or lack of discretion and independent judgment.

This is a disappointing decision for employers hoping that the high court would grant cert and reverse Davis by holding that: 1) the District Court’s determination that the exemption applied in the case at bar was the proper one; and 2) the administrative/production dichotomy is of “limited assistance outside the manufacturing context.” Savage v. Unite Here, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32219 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2008).

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On the heels of its ruling in Shady Grove regarding the inapplicability of state procedural rules in federal court (discussed here), on April 19, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision reviving another dismissed class action.  In Holster v. Gatco Inc., Case Number 08-1307, the Court granted the appeal petition of an individual seeking to bring a class action in New York federal court under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (a different law than the one at issue in Shady Grove), and sent the case immediately back to the Second Circuit to consider whether the plaintiff could proceed with a Rule 23 class action in light of Shady Grove. Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3118 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2010).  This second ruling reinforces the initial interpretation of Shady Grove: namely, that class actions brought in federal court (including those alleging state law claims under statutes such as the New York Labor Law) are governed by Rule 23, and procedural limitations on those class actions contained in the state’s procedural rules may not apply. 

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The Supreme Court dealt a blow to New York wage-and-hour defendants sued in federal court last week, overruling established precedent requiring plaintiffs bringing New York Labor Law (“Labor Law”) class actions in federal court to waive the 25% liquidated damages “penalty” in order to proceed on a class basis.  In Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. LEXIS 2929 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2010), the Supreme Court applied the age-old test from Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and held that the state law rule requiring such a waiver is “procedural” as opposed to “substantive”, and has no application in federal court, where opt-out class actions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 

Class action Labor Law plaintiffs in federal court now may seek a 25% penalty in behalf of all class members, increasing the potential class-wide damages.  It remains a divided question, unanswered by the higher courts, as to whether any wage-and-hour plaintiff may recover the 25% penalty and the 100% liquidated damages under the FLSA for the same time period.  Compare Yu G. Ke v. Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 240, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) with Jin v. Pac. Buffet House, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74901 at * 24 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009).

Other states containing class action limitations in their state procedural codes, whose federal courts previously had deferred to the state rule, may now also be subject to class actions in federal court seeking relief under the state’s wage-and-hour laws.   However, the Court did not conclusively state that all such provisions were unenforceable but rather focused its analysis on the intent of the New York provision requiring waiver of penalties.

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The Supreme Court, on March 22, 2010, agreed to answer a question that has divided the circuit courts of appeal—whether the FLSA retaliation provision protects verbal complaints made by employees or only written ones. The Court will review the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2009), where the Seventh Circuit held verbal complaints regarding unlawful pay practices do not fall under the protections of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).  The decision follows the Second and Fourth Circuits, which previously held that an employee is not protected from retaliation under the FLSA where the employee has not complained in writing, based on the statutory requirement that the retaliation be in response to a “filing” (Note: the Second Circuit goes even further -- declining to protect internal written complaints and protecting only formal complaints to the DOL or a court). In Kasten, the Seventh Circuit agreed with this interpretation, and held that since Plaintiff’s complaints were “purely verbal”, this was fatal to his claim.  Id. at 838. 

Several circuit courts, including the First, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth, however, have ruled verbal complaints are sufficient. Three judges dissented in the Seventh Circuit’s subsequent decision in Kasten to deny rehearing en banc, citing these cases. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 585 F.3d 310 (7th Cir. 2009). The dissenters criticized the majority's decision, observing: "the [Seventh Circuit] has taken a position contrary to the longstanding view of the Department of Labor, departed from the holdings of other circuits, and interpreted the statutory language in a way that [we] believe is contrary to the understanding of Congress." Id. at 311.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Kasten, whether accepting or rejecting the Seventh Circuit’s employer-friendly approach, will hopefully provide some clarification regarding whether internal verbal complaints are protected under federal law. As always, state laws may (and do) differ.

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